Livelihoods, basic services and social protection in north-western Pakistan

Working Paper 5
Babar Shahbaz, Qasim Ali Shah, Abid Q. Suleri, Steve Commins and Akbar Ali Malik
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About us

Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) aims to generate a stronger evidence base on how people make a living, educate their children, deal with illness and access other basic services in conflict-affected situations (CAS). Providing better access to basic services, social protection and support to livelihoods matters for the human welfare of people affected by conflict, the achievement of development targets such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and international efforts at peace- and state-building.

At the centre of SLRC’s research are three core themes, developed over the course of an intensive one-year inception phase:

- State legitimacy: experiences, perceptions and expectations of the state and local governance in conflict-affected situations
- State capacity: building effective states that deliver services and social protection in conflict-affected situations
- Livelihood trajectories and economic activity under conflict

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) is the lead organisation. SLRC partners include the Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA) in Sri Lanka, Feinstein International Center (FIC, Tufts University), the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Pakistan, Disaster Studies of Wageningen University (WUR) in the Netherlands, the Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>AREU</td>
<td>Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit</td>
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<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>BISP</td>
<td>Benazir Income Support Programme</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Conflict-affected Situation</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>COMSATS</td>
<td>Commission on Science and Technology for Sustainable Development in the South</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DNA</td>
<td>Damage and Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>DRRC</td>
<td>District Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Committee</td>
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<td>DSC</td>
<td>Divisional Steering Committee</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization</td>
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<td>FANA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Northern Areas</td>
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<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
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<td>FODP</td>
<td>Friends of Democratic Pakistan</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HRCP</td>
<td>Human Rights Commission of Pakistan</td>
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<td>HRDS</td>
<td>Human Resource Development Society</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IRDP</td>
<td>Integrated Rural Development Programme</td>
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<td>IUCN</td>
<td>International Union for Conservation of Nature</td>
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<td>KP</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MDTF</td>
<td>Multi-donor Trust Fund</td>
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<td>NDMA</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Authority</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>NORAD</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>NRG</td>
<td>Nepal Research Group</td>
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<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North-west Frontier Province</td>
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<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PaRRSA</td>
<td>Provincial Relief, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority</td>
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<td>BKPAP</td>
<td>Bacha Khan Poverty Alleviation Programme</td>
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<td>PBM</td>
<td>Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal</td>
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<td>PCNA</td>
<td>Post Crisis Needs Assessment</td>
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<td>PCP</td>
<td>Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy</td>
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<td>PDMA</td>
<td>Provincial Disaster Management Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Provincial Steering Committee</td>
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<td>SDPI</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Policy Institute</td>
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<td>SLRC</td>
<td>Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium</td>
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<td>SDPC</td>
<td>Social Development Policy Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPO</td>
<td>Strengthening Participatory Organisation</td>
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<td>SRSP</td>
<td>Sarhad Rural Support Programme</td>
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<td>SSG</td>
<td>Special Support Group</td>
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<td>SSG</td>
<td>Special Support Group</td>
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<td>SDPI</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Policy Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>UN Population Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commission for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UN Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>UN Development Fund for Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Village-AID</td>
<td>Village Agricultural and Industrial Development Programme</td>
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<td>WDI</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WUR</td>
<td>Wageningen University</td>
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Preface

This paper is one of a series of evidence papers produced by the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) as part of its inception phase (January 2011 to March 2012). Seven country evidence papers have been produced (Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, South Sudan, Uganda and DRC) and are supported by two global evidence papers focusing on social protection and basic services, and growth and livelihoods respectively. Each paper systematically explores and assesses the available evidence about livelihoods, social protection and basic services in the country. The papers do not attempt to generate new data, nor produce new analyses. Rather they assess what is already known and review the quality of the current evidence base. The papers, along with a series of global and country-based stakeholder holder consultations, have been used to formulate the future research agenda of the SLRC.

This paper was written by Babar Shahbaz, Qasim Ali Shah, Abid Q. Suleri, Steve Commins and Akbar Ali Malik. The authors are grateful to Shafqat Munir for the input provided during the development of the paper. Thanks also to DFID staff for their comments on earlier versions of the paper. Responsibility for the arguments and views presented in the paper lie with the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of SLRC partner organisations or the UK Department for International Development (DFID) which funds the SLRC.
Executive summary

According to the government of Pakistan (2011), the direct and indirect cost of the spill-over effects of the war in Afghanistan and related military actions, frequently called the War on Terror, incurred during the past decade by Pakistan have amounted to nearly USD 70 billion. What’s more, although staggering, this figure fails to capture the devastating effects of the conflict and its associated disruptions on the lives and livelihoods of certain parts of Pakistan's population. While Pakistan remains one of the highest recipients of international aid in the world, with aid inflows dominated by geopolitical priorities and by the crisis of law and order in the country, the relative amount of aid to its gross domestic product (GDP) is actually quite modest.

Pakistan’s aid flows and security issues are related to challenges of governance, as highlighted by the various manifestations of religious extremism and related militancy in the country, which are concentrated mainly in the northwest region, particularly within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of Malakand division in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. In addition to militancy, the massive monsoon floods of 2010 caused unprecedented losses to people’s lives and the economy of KP. The combination of these two factors – conflict and flooding – has created a compound crisis affecting areas of KP that were already at the bottom of the Human Development Index (HDI) for the country as a whole. Overall, the prevalence of poverty and food insecurity in rural KP and FATA is higher than the national average. In a situation of pre-existing political changes (decentralisation and governance arrangements), poverty and low human development, the conflicts in KP and FATA have severely damaged relatively poor public and private infrastructure; therefore livelihood opportunities have further reduced.

Against this backdrop, this paper reviews evidence from the existing literature regarding poverty, livelihoods, food insecurity, access to basic services, social protection and aid and governance in conflict-affected areas of Pakistan’s KP province and FATA. The evidence was collected from various sources, including digital libraries, internet search engines, project reports by different aid agencies, newspapers, books and online journals. Based on the literature reviewed, the review finds that the complex linkages between individual (human), provincial (regional) and national (state) factors, as well as the spill-over from larger global security processes, make it difficult to address these different aspects of security in isolation. If any type of security is compromised, the cumulative effect may be much greater and more harmful; for instance, conflict may be both a cause and effect of hunger/food insecurity (S. Malik, 2011; Messer and Cohen, 2006; Rice, 2007), and sometimes ‘poverty breeds insecurity’ (Rice, 2007).

The impact of conflict and political fragility is uneven in any country context, and in the case of Pakistan this is especially notable, given the size of the country’s population and its political and geographic diversity. In this review’s focus areas, Malakand division and FATA of KP, economic and physical infrastructures have been severely damaged and, as a result, people in communities have suffered from reduced livelihoods and access to basic services. The already precarious situation worsened when local inhabitants of Malakand division had to leave their houses in anticipation of the Pakistani Army’s military action against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in 2009. Peace in Malakand was partially restored during late 2009 and there has been considerable improvement in the law and order situation; the reconstruction process has started, particularly in Swat district, but at a slow pace. The evidence suggests that the different coping strategies adopted by the local people include migration to the big cities of Pakistan, compromising on nutritious food intake, borrowing money and seeking alternative (non-natural resource-based) livelihood strategies.

In particular, this review identifies the following impacts of KP and FATA’s compound crisis:

- **On basic services.** Education is among those sectors that have been severely affected by conflict and the War on Terror in KP and FATA. Poor services and inadequate access to public education in KP and FATA, accompanied by radicalisation through unregistered madressas (religious schools), are major drivers of crisis. Reconstruction and rehabilitation of the education sector has proceeded at a rather slow pace. Similarly, health facilities in KP and FATA suffer from a lack
of equipment, medicines and other essential supplies. Although various types of social safety nets are working in conflict-affected areas, some large-scale programmes initiated by the state with support from international donors are reported to have been influenced by elites and are least accessible by the less powerful or less well-connected people in crisis-affected areas.

- **On livelihoods.** The regions under consideration are primarily rural, with people relying on farming, raising livestock and earnings from local or external labour markets. The loss of livestock, agricultural tools and seeds, access to farms and local employment has severely affected the wellbeing of poor individuals, households and communities. Income losses have been significant for some households. In addition, the impact on livelihoods has been increased by the wider disruption of markets and the infrastructure that enables markets to function.

- **On markets.** The militancy and military operations have had a negative impact on the functioning of the markets in FATA and KP. War has led to the physical destruction of markets and transport infrastructure, including shops, storage space, transport vehicles and roads. Consequently, traders are adopting coping strategies that are likely to be harmful to consumers, such as increased prices, reduced scale of operation, etc., which has further compromised the ability of households to purchase food and reduced sales volumes.

In terms of institutional support to those affected by the crises, local, national and international actors have provided aid in different forms under different institutional arrangements. A variety of bilateral and multilateral international organisations have become very active in the conflict-affected areas, and many of the donors with established programmes in Pakistan immediately channelled aid for conflict-affected people. A Provincial Relief, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority (PaRRSA) was created in 2009 under the umbrella of the Provincial Disaster Management Agency, as a mechanism to coordinate relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in the crisis-affected areas. To generate assistance and aid from external donors, a forum, Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FODP), was also formed. However, this could not provide substantial support to restore people’s livelihoods. With support from a range of international donors, the World Bank established a Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF) to mobilise international development aid to finance critical investments in support of reconstruction and peace building. In many cases, agencies are working through support networks established in the course of their regular project work. However, we know relatively little about the effectiveness and impacts of external and domestic aid institutions.

This review identifies a number of key lessons for policy and programming.

First, international donors and government authorities have been inconsistent and uneven in how they have responded to and addressed the diversity of impacts of the conflict and flood displacements on livelihoods, services and markets. Despite reforms in the international humanitarian system, and greater attention to disaster management by the government of Pakistan, the current functioning of different institutions is inadequate in terms of contextual assessment, priority setting and implementation.

Second, the current institutional landscape of development assistance hinders efforts to address the diversity of needs in a more integrated, effective manner. External, including foreign, agencies still lack understanding of pre-existing conditions, the internal dynamics of different communities and the diverse and gendered responses of individuals, households and communities to conflict and the flood. There is a risk that external definitions of security as purely an issue of insurgents ignore important ways in which the conflict and the flood have affected women and men’s security. Purely security-driven responses have limited impact with regard to other types of responses, particularly to support the interests and needs of women.

Third, donors need to give greater attention to both local livelihood factors and broader linkages with market and enabling factors in conflict and disaster situations. This requires an understanding of the pre-existing (inevitably unequal and problematic in some ways) conditions. When various manifestations of markets have been damaged or destroyed, donors need to give attention to the enabling environment that supports these, as well as to household livelihoods. This will depend on an assessment of the level of loss, the profile of the affected and the political economy of the markets and the market holders.
Greater understanding of local dynamics, pre-conflict and post-conflict, can guide donors in terms of reinvigorating the private sector, targeting investments and providing essential financing for market support. In rebuilding households in KP and FATA, restocking of livestock, short-term cash transfers to reduce debt and maintain household consumption and agricultural tools and seeds may all be required. Beyond the household, donors and government agencies need to attend to the rebuilding of physical infrastructure, the reopening of shops and wider factors in the value or supply chains, such as transport, finance and fuel.

These programmes can be implemented by different local agencies, depending on the skills and capacity of the organisation involved. This may include cooperatives, local civil society organisations, local financial institutions, agencies of local government and partners of national and international non-governmental organisations. These agencies may seek to build on some elements of previous market and production systems, but also may, carefully, use opportunity for reforms and changes, while being realistic (i.e. forms of exclusion, power, property holding do not disappear because of conflict or a disaster).

Finally, there are several glaring gaps in the existing evidence base, the identification of which may inform future research. In terms of data availability and research, the following aspects are found to be underrepresented: impact assessment of early interventions; studies on the roles of informal institutions; research into the inclusion/exclusion of different social groups from access to basic services and livelihood opportunities; and gender-sensitive data in the context of conflict. True, most interventions in conflict-affected areas of KP and FATA are still on-going, but we have still been unable to find rigorous and scientific impact assessments of completed interventions. There is slightly better but still inadequate evidence on people’s own initiatives in terms of socioeconomic recovery or dealing with the impacts of the conflict.

Last but not least, despite the proliferation of donor programmes, NGO activity and cross-institutional collaboration, there seem to be very little empirical insight available regarding the nature of these initiatives and networks. We also find almost negligible evidence on questions such as: Do local networks represent local interests? Are they accountable, and to whom (not only to the donor)? Are they effective?
1 Introduction

This review paper synthesises and assesses evidence from the existing literature on poverty and livelihoods, access to basic services and social protection, and aid and its governance in conflict-affected areas of Pakistan, particularly the north-western province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the Federally Administrative Tribal Areas (FATA). More specifically, it focuses on a number of important questions, including:

- How have crises affected the livelihoods, wellbeing and access to services of people in KP and FATA?
- What has the formal institutional response looked like (of both domestic and external actors), and how effective has it been in supporting and rebuilding damaged livelihoods?
- What is the role of markets in shaping people’s livelihoods, and how have crises affected local economic activity?

Where appropriate, special attention is also paid to the question of evidence: in addition to its extent, what is the quality of the evidence base? How robust are studies and are they ‘good enough’ to inform decision-making?

The review is desk based, drawing on sources identified through various literature searches, including: reports by aid agencies; academic literature, such as journal articles, books and periodicals; online resources, such as needs assessments and impact evaluations; and other unpublished documents gathered in-country. Parts of the review are also informed by a series of stakeholder consultations conducted as part of the work of the Sustainable Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC).

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a contextual overview of the situation in Pakistan, with an initial focus on the country’s macro-level social, economic and political context, before moving on to discuss the conflict-affected areas of KP and FATA in particular. Section 3 looks at the impacts of conflict and flooding on livelihoods and explores coping strategies at the individual, household and community levels. Section 4 focuses on the formal institutional response to the crises in KP and FATA, describing the institutional arrangements in place, outlining government and agency activities and programmes, presenting information on impact and reflecting on effectiveness. Section 5 offers an in-depth analysis of the response to date, with a particular focus on governance. Section 6 reflects on the nature of available data and evidence before Section 7 concludes.

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1 The original Terms of Reference for this review appear as Annex 1.
Con text: setting the scene

2.1 Country context

Pakistan is the sixth most populous country in the world, with an annual population growth rate of 2.05 percent (Government of Pakistan, 2011). Although the economy is the 28th largest in the world in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) (CIA, 2011), it is in the lower stratum of the 2011 Human Development Index (HDI), with a rating of 0.504 and ranking 145 among 187 countries (UNDP, 2011). The national HDI is lower than both the South Asian and the world average. Gender inequality is widespread, with Pakistan standing at 0.573 on the Gender Inequality Index, at 115 out of 169 countries (ibid.).

Agriculture has remained the mainstay of the economy, providing employment to 45 percent of the population and inputs for agro-based industry. Inflation has been a major problem, with levels reaching as high as 13.9 percent during 2010. Real GDP is estimated to have grown at 2.4 percent during 2011 as a result of strong performance in the services sector, against actual growth of 3.8 percent last year and a target of 4.5 percent (Government of Pakistan, 2011). Economic activity has slowed in recent years as a consequence of increased armed conflict and political instability and the occurrence of natural disasters (ibid.). A major shock to the economy came in the form of the 2010 floods, which caused losses of up to USD 9.7 billion, according to a 2010 Damage and Needs Assessment (DNA) (ADB and World Bank, 2010).

2.1.1 Pakistan’s development challenges

A considerable body of literature is available on the development challenges confronting Pakistan. These challenges are diverse and both chronic as well as acute in nature, and directly affect people’s livelihood security (Bari, 2010; Memon et al., 2010; Qadir, 2002; Waseem, 2011; Yasseen, 2011). Contrary to the paradigms of people-centric development (Alkire, 2003) and human security (Timothy, 2004), a state-security paradigm supersedes all others in Pakistan (Najam, 2004). This remains confined to traditional ‘state security’ and is not broadened to include emerging dimensions of security (e.g. Alkire, 2003; Florini and Simmons, 1998) such as non-traditional security (Thakur and Newman, 2004), including human security (e.g. diseases, environment, food insecurity, crime, corruption, etc.). Nonetheless, in the words of Qadir (2002: 333), ‘failure to achieve any substantial progress toward SD [sustainable development] in Pakistan, thus, is largely due to the state, which has assumed such a leading role in most SD related activities as well as in governance’.

Recently, Sadia Malik (2011) empirically examined the association between socioeconomic measures of deprivation – such as food insecurity, landlessness, unemployment and human underdevelopment – and incidence of violent conflict. She found that landlessness and food insecurity seem to be positively associated with the probability of violent attacks across districts in Pakistan. Similarly, Fair (2008) found unemployment to be extremely high among militants of Kashmir and Afghanistan, despite their having basic education. In the context of conflict-affected areas of Pakistan, Roshan (2010, in Kugelman and Hathaway, 2010) utilised the conflict map of KP and FATA published by the BBC Urdu service that identifies districts with respect to the degree of presence of militants to provide evidence on the link between food insecurity and violent conflict. The author found that all districts and tribal agencies classified as having a ‘Taliban stronghold’ had the worst level of food insecurity and were designated ‘extremely food insecure’ using the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) classification.

Pakistan’s development challenges present a familiar narrative, where insecurity in any form (e.g. poverty, food insecurity) breeds other forms of insecurities, such as in the form of violent conflict (S. Malik, 2011; Messer and Cohen, 2006; Rice, 2007). The stance of the government is that the ‘Pakistan’s economy is under pressure of the War on Terror’ (Government of Pakistan, 2011: 219), but, as discussed above, the state’s efforts towards development, especially in KP and FATA, were relatively unsuccessful even before the conflict.

2.1.2 Government and governance in Pakistan

Pakistan is a relatively new nation state, and its government structure has evolved over time to adjust to some of the structures inherited from the pre-1947 period. These structures involve regional
identities that long predate ‘British India’, and are deeply rooted in language, religion, local political formations and economic systems. This has meant that the country’s federal system has continually had to adjust to different manifestations of ethnic diversity and identity politics. The country’s political system includes four provinces as well as a number of special areas, including FATA, the Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA) and Kashmir. The provinces have been structured around four main ethnic groups: Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluchis and Pashtuns, each of which is characterised by a variety of sub-groups based on ethno-linguistic, occupational and caste divisions. In Baluchistan and Sindh in particular, these divergent histories and identities have been harnessed by nationalist and secessionist movements directly challenging the federal government (Democratisation and Transitional Justice Cluster, 2009).

In August 2001, Pakistan initiated a decentralisation programme designed to empower and transfer responsibilities to provincial and local governments. This required developing capacity within sub-national governments to implement these reforms. Provincial governments were given more policymaking powers and local governments were made largely responsible for social service delivery, regulation of environmental assets and labour and commercial activity. Enhancing provincial fiscal and financial capacities was identified as a key element in ensuring the efficient flow of funds to the local governments.

The Parliament of Pakistan recently (April 2010) passed the 18th Amendment, which guarantees the federal parliamentary system and reduces presidential powers. It also abolished the concurrent list, thereby restricting the federal government’s ability to legislate on such essential subjects as corporate law, drugs, medicines, trusteeship, etc. This represents a compromise on three issues: the role of Islam; the sharing of power between the federal government and the provinces; and the division of responsibilities between the president and the prime minister, with a greatly strengthened position for the latter. The Federal Legislature is to function like the British Parliament. In order to allay fears of the provinces concerning the domination of the centre, the Amendment established a bicameral legislature with a Senate (the upper house), providing equal provincial representation, and a National Assembly (the lower house), allocating seats according to population. This Amendment represents a significant opportunity to devolve power and authority to the provinces.

The specific manifestations of conflict in sub-national settings provide the rationale for a geographical focus on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the Federally Administrative Tribal Areas (FATA). These areas have historically been ‘different’ from other parts of Pakistan, because of the ways they were integrated into the newly formed state in 1947 and in relation to various political structures over the past six decades. In addition, these areas have been affected by the spill-over from the conflict in Afghanistan, which has affected livelihoods and services, as well as the functions and processes of government.

2.1.3 Development initiatives

2.1.3.1 Government

Over the past five decades, the government of Pakistan has launched numerous rural development programmes during different political and military regimes with the goal of improving the country’s rural economy (World Bank, 2007). The first programme of this nature started in the early 1950s as the Village Agricultural and Industrial Development Programme (Village-AID) (Luqman et al., 2005). During its early period, this attained some success, but it later suffered from inter-departmental jealousy and political change in the country (Davidson and Ahmad, 2003). With the closure of Village-AID in early 1960s, rural development became a part of the Basic Democracies System. This had the same fate as Village-AID, as a result of a top-down approach in planning, implementation and decision-making with regard to rural development policies (Khan and Khan, 2001).

In the early 1970s, the then newly elected government closed down the Basic Democracies System and introduced the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP), which established basic institutions and achieved some success, but its impact on poor people in rural areas was nominal (Davidson et al., 2001). The Rural Works Programme continued side-by-side with the IRDP but was furnished with a new name, the People’s Works Programme, during the 1970s (Choudhary, 2002). This programme also ended because of inter-departmental resentment and excessive bureaucracy in the planning and implementation of rural development campaigns. Many short-term plans were launched in the mid-1980s; for example, during 1985–8, the prime minister’s five development points were introduced to
promote the welfare and prosperity of rural communities. This gained had success because of strong political commitment but came to an abrupt end as a result of a change in government (World Bank, 2007).

In 1991, the Tameer-e-Watan programme commenced with the participation of elected senators and members of national and provincial assemblies. Although the programme improved the physical infrastructure in some areas, its collective performance was reported as unsatisfactory. Corruption and sudden political change in the country were the main reasons for its failure (Khan and Khan, 2001). During early 1990s, the government initiated the Social Action Programme with assistance from international funding agencies (Azizi, 1999). Political change in the country terminated this and the Khushal Pakistan Programme was launched, with the aim of providing basic social services to people at the grassroots level (Government of Pakistan, 2005). Another change in political regime in the country led to the Devolution of Power Plan in 2001, to uplift the economic status of rural people through pooling their resources at grassroots level (Luqman et al., 2007; Zaidi, 2005). However, numerous programmes and approaches on the part of the government of Pakistan, such as rural development programmes (World Bank, 2004), rural support programmes and the Social Action Plan, could not create much of a positive impact on people’s lives (Qadir, 2002).

The current Pakistan People’s Party–led alliance government took power in February 2008, at a time when the world was facing the 3F (food, fuel and financial) crisis. Pakistan, however, was facing a 5F crisis: food, fuel and financial plus frontiers (War on Terror across and around its Western Frontiers) and functional democracy (governance) (Suleri, 2010b). In 2010, a sixth F – fragility of climate manifested through catastrophic flooding – was added to the list of challenges (Wasti, 2011). It has been argued that all of these crises are interconnected and their cumulative effect is much greater than the individual effect of any of these factors on its own (Khalid, 2011; Suleri and Haq, 2010).

2.1.3.2 International aid
In absolute terms, Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of foreign aid in the world. However, it is not an aid-dependent country. Official development assistance (ODA) accounts for only around 2 percent of Pakistan’s GDP (OECD, 2011). The country has historically received large volumes of aid at points in its history, but levels have been quite volatile. In addition, it has faced an increasingly difficult task of aid coordination. In 2007, Pakistan received more than USD 2.2 billion in ODA, ranking the country as the sixth largest recipient of official aid in the world. This overall sum, however, came from diverse sources in an inconsistent manner and was channelled to many different activities, often through a combination of budgetary and non-budgetary arrangements (Malik, 2009).

The proliferation of a very large number of small-sized projects leaves the government with the daunting task of coordinating and aligning a multitude of aid activities, often with limited success. The time and resources spent on coordination, involving frequent meetings with individual donors and the preparation of various aid-related reports, have been identified as the most obvious transaction costs associated with high aid fragmentation (Malik, 2009). In 2006, only 41 percent of total ODA was disbursed in support of initiatives that adopted programme-based approaches, with 82 percent of this share coming from only two major donors – the World Bank and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Moreover, only 12 percent of 592 field missions conducted by 16 major donors in 2005 were coordinated in some way.

Thus, while international donors have provided a large volume of aid to Pakistan, it is relatively small compared with the country’s overall GDP, and it has been poorly focused and structured. In addition, in the period since 2001, much US government aid has been more politicised and inconsistent in its goals, with ‘development’ and ‘security’ agendas mixed in ways that have arguably reduced programme effectiveness.

2.2 Conflict-affected areas of KP and FATA
KP province of Pakistan is a densely populated region that covers an area of 10.17 million hectares and has a population of approximately 15 million. Bounded by the Karakorum, Hindu Kush and Himalayan Mountains in the north and Afghanistan to the northwest (see Figure 1), its strategic geographical location has made it vulnerable to different types of crises and conflicts (World Bank, 2010). The
province has witnessed an array of crises and conflict situations during the past few decades, from the Soviet–Afghan war in the 1980s to the post-war crisis during the 1990s to today's post-9/11 era and the ongoing War on Terror (Waseem, 2011; WFP, 2010; Zafar, 2011). However, it is not just political crises that have affected the province. In late July 2010, KP became the first of Pakistan’s provinces to be hit by an unprecedented flood, ‘purported to be the most severe natural disaster to have affected the region in over a century’ (Government of KP and UNDP, 2011: v).

These crises are shaped by a number of factors, including contest for power and influence between national actors – civil/military establishment, Islamic groups (Waseen, 2011) and tribes with strong tribal traditions (Sultan-i-Rome, 2005) – the region’s vital geostrategic location and the subsequent (often violent) actions of international actors and global powers to protect their vested interests, as well as unfavourable geographic conditions. Thus, a long history of crises, including various political contestations, has severely affected the lives of the people of these areas (Geiser, 2012).

This review focuses primarily on Malakand division (Swat, Dir, Malakand, Shangla and Buner districts) of KP and FATA. Both of these areas are mountainous and have recently undergone a fierce war between Pakistan military forces and the Taliban. The recent conflict began immediately after September 2001, when Pakistani military forces started to infiltrate FATA in search of foreign militants in 2002 and were consequently resisted by different Taliban groups during the succeeding years (Aziz and Luras, 2010; WFP, 2010). In late 2007, the Taliban took control over a sizeable area of Swat and started to proceed towards adjoining districts; ultimately, in 2009, the Pakistani Army launched a series of operations in Malakand division (in Swat, Lower Dir, Upper Dir, Shangla and Buner districts) and some regions of FATA (Petter et al., 2011; World Bank 2010), leading to an internally displaced person (IDP) crisis. A sizeable proportion of the population (almost 3 million) left their homes and took refuge in the safer districts (World Bank, 2010). After a few months of fierce fighting, the army took control of Malakand division; fighting in FATA is still ongoing. Although the majority of anti-government conflict in KP has been concentrated in Swat district, some conflict has spilt over into adjacent districts, in particular Shangla during the 2007 conflict and Shangla, Dir and Buner during the 2009 conflict (UNESCO, 2010a). The earthquake of 2005 and floods in 2010 have also badly damaged the area’s public and private infrastructure.
The crisis-affected areas of Malakand and FATA are densely populated, with generally strong annual growth rates, as Table 1 indicates.

**Table 1: Estimated population of crisis-affected areas of Malakand and FATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buner</td>
<td>506,000</td>
<td>3.86%</td>
<td>767,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Dir</td>
<td>718,000</td>
<td>3.42%</td>
<td>1,039,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Dir</td>
<td>576,000</td>
<td>2.76%</td>
<td>777,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shangla</td>
<td>435,000</td>
<td>3.27%</td>
<td>619,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swat</td>
<td>1,258,000</td>
<td>3.37%</td>
<td>1,811,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajaur (FATA)</td>
<td>595,227</td>
<td>4.33%</td>
<td>948,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohmand (FATA)</td>
<td>334,453</td>
<td>4.28%</td>
<td>530,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,422,680</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.26%</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,494,314</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government of KP (2011)

2.2.1 Human Development Index and poverty indicators

The overall development indicators of KP and FATA present a gloomy picture, even before militancy. The prevalence of poverty in rural KP and FATA is higher than the national average (World Bank, 2010). Education indicators are also worse, with a net enrolment rate of 54 percent and 45 percent as compared with the national average of 61 percent and 54 percent for boys and girls, respectively (Government of Pakistan, 2008; UNESCO, 2010b). The literacy rate in rural areas especially, among females, is strikingly low (see Table 2). Pakistan ranked 145 out of 187 countries on the HDI in 2011, which was well behind other South Asian countries such as Sri Lanka, India and Bhutan (UNDP, 2011).
Within Pakistan, KP province ranked third out of four provinces on the HDI, and there is a wide gap between urban and rural areas in the province (Hussain, 2003). An isolated geographical location, harsh weather, a scattered population, underdeveloped markets and inadequate investment in human capital have been among the key characteristics of the poverty problem in the crisis-affected mountainous areas of KP (Suleri et al., 2009).

Table 2: Selected development indicators of Pakistan, KP and FATA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>KP</th>
<th>FATA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate (female)</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate (Rural)</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to clean drinking water</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population to doctor ratio</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>1,594</td>
<td>2,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads per km²</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A study carried out by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in 12 mountainous districts (including conflict- and crisis-affected districts) in 2008 indicated that, in terms of the road network, Malakand and Swat were ‘extremely poor’, whereas Upper Dir and Lower Dir were ‘very poor’. Similarly for health facilities, Swat, Upper and Lower Dir, Shangla and Buner were extremely poor and Malakand was very poor. Likewise for adult literacy, female literacy, toilet facilities and access to banks: conflict-affected districts were ranked as extremely poor or very poor (Suleri et al., 2009).

One of the casualties of ongoing conflict in FATA and KP is public infrastructure, especially schools (particularly girls’ schools), which have been blown up by the Taliban. However, with respect to public assets, empirical studies (Awais, 2005; Shahbaz, 2006; Steimann, 2004) indicate that the access of ordinary people to schools and medical institutions was limited even before the current army operation against Islamic militants in the area. In most crisis-affected areas of KP, educational institutions (except primary schools) are located far from the village, and lack of sufficient facilities for girls and poverty are some of the main reasons for the low education rate in KP’s rural areas (Shahbaz, 2009; Steimann, 2005). Other studies (Awais, 2005; Shahbaz, 2009; Steimann, 2003) indicate that medical facilities in the mountainous areas of KP are located far from villages along poor roads. This situation deteriorated further after the floods of 2010, which hit the mountainous districts of KP and FATA badly.

2.2.2 Livelihoods and markets

Rural people’s ownership of and access to certain livelihood assets may have a positive impact on their strategies for coping with vulnerabilities and risks (Chambers and Conway, 1992). Agriculture in KP is largely a small farm activity and small farms (less than 5 hectares) take up 41% of the total farming area, with 85% of the total number of farms, compared with an average of 60 percent across Pakistan (Government of NWFP, 2003; WFP, 2010). Smallholdings, difficult terrain and unpredictable weather conditions limit productivity (Shahbaz, 2006; Steimann, 2003). According to the World Food Programme (WFP, 2010), landholdings in conflict-affected areas of Malakand and FATA are very small and distribution is skewed. Only 7 percent of people consider farming their main occupation. Consequently, production of crops among small farmers is much below subsistence levels, and many work as wage labourers to earn enough to survive. Wheat is the most important rabi (winter) crop, occupying the bulk of cultivated land. Maize, rice, fruit and tobacco are the main kharif (summer) crops, and vegetables are grown throughout the year. Sugarcane, tobacco and fruits are the primary cash crops. Agriculture in this region is completely rainfall dependent, and scarcity of water resources has been recorded during the past decade. Forest resources are also depleting at an alarming rate, and in fact the deforestation rate in the mountainous areas of KP is one of the highest in the world (FAO, 2005).

Northwest highland regions of KP province are generally resource scarce and underdeveloped (Hussain, 2003); the same factors may be the cause of limited livelihood opportunities in these areas. Land for agricultural use is not readily available; small pieces of land are cultivated on terraces that do not give full freedom to farmers to apply the latest cultivation practices or to manage good production. Harsh
weather, remoteness and inadequate infrastructure are some of the factors limiting better agricultural production (Shahbaz et al., 2010). Migration is also a very important coping strategy for people living in KP in general, and particularly for those in conflict-affected areas (Shahbaz, 2009; Steimann, 2005; Suleri and Savage, 2006).

Agricultural production mainly serves the purpose of subsistence, whereas, because of limited economic activities, the main source of income for most households in conflict-affected areas is remittances received from those working in the industrial cities of Pakistan or abroad, followed by daily wage labour (Awais, 2005; Steimann, 2003; Suleri and Savage, 2006). A lack of technically oriented education means most migrants are engaged in minor, manual labour-oriented work (Shahbaz, 2009; Steimann, 2004). Women have relatively less access to financial capital as compared with males (Siegmann and Sadaf, 2006).

In 2010, the WFP conducted a food security and market assessment in crisis-affected areas of KP and FATA (WFP, 2010), which revealed that Malakand division and FATA were the most disadvantaged in terms of food crop production. In 2009, when military operations began in Malakand, the wheat crop, fruits and vegetables were ready for harvesting. Farming households left the area and abandoned their farms, and consequently food crops rotted and were attacked by pests/insects (ibid.). These districts and FATA already had a high deficit in crop-based food production (Suleri and Haq, 2009), given the hard mountainous terrain of the region. However, various types of crises (conflicts, floods and earthquakes) have since further exacerbated the situation, and FATA today retains the unenviable title of being Pakistan’s most highly food-deficit administrative unit (Hussain and Routray, 2012). Households suffering from food insecurity depend mostly on wage labour and small business. Most of the food-insecure population live in kucha (unpaved) houses and own very few assets (WFP, 2010).

The various challenges and issues outlined above help explain why KP and FATA are way off course in terms of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (see Table 3).
**Table 3: Will KP achieve the MDGs? Findings of the KP MDG Report 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Key findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MDG 1 (poverty and hunger)</td>
<td>Poverty levels higher than the national average. Massive levels of food insecurity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG 2 (primary education)</td>
<td>Literacy rates lower than national average and a substantial gender gap. Lack of resources channelled to education and existing funds spent on teachers’ salaries rather than infrastructure or quality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG 3 (gender equality and empowerment)</td>
<td>Gender gaps on almost all social indicators. Little done to directly reduce gender inequality by the KP government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG 4 (child mortality)</td>
<td>Inconsistencies across the data, but immunisation seems to have been quite successful in some urban areas and less successful in certain rural areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG 5 (maternal health)</td>
<td>According to 2006/07 data, maternal mortality rate for KP was 275/100,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG 6 (disease)</td>
<td>Data very sketchy. HIV/AIDS data available only for district of Peshawar where levels were recorded at 12.8% for drug users and 1.2% for transsexual sex workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG 7 (environment)</td>
<td>KP fares poorly on water and sanitation indicators, but does very well on indicators related to wildlife management and preservation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>‘The province of KP, which has been in the frontline of the security problems that have rent the nation, is not on track to achieve the ambitious MDG agenda’ (ix). Positive change is dependent on the security situation and the go-ahead of post-floods reconstruction efforts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government of KP and UNDP (2011)

Given this background, this review seeks a deeper understanding of people’s perceptions, responses and coping strategies regarding livelihoods, social protection and access to basic services in conflict-affected areas of KP and FATA. The paper also attempts to synthesise the evidence on institutional arrangements and actual practices of the state, aid agencies and the private sector in promoting livelihood security, social protection and access to basic services.
Livelihoods and coping strategies in crisis

3.1 Impacts on physical and human capital: displacement, agriculture and food security

Large swathes of KP and FATA have been affected in different ways by the floods and conflict, depending on their location, with impacts on livelihoods quite uneven. Some of this owes to specific geographic factors (terrain, distance or proximity to conflict or flood impact) or access to resources, but other factors are more political-economic in nature, such as inequitable power relations. A combination of pre-existing factors and the specifics of the flood or conflict impact has thus shaped how communities and households have been affected and what is necessary for them to recover.

As indicated in Section 2, the already inadequate economic, social and physical infrastructure of Malakand division and FATA has been seriously damaged by the violent spill-over from the War on Terror, the Taliban insurgency and severe flooding. The situation deteriorated further when local inhabitants of Malakand division were forced to leave their homes in anticipation of the Pakistani Army’s military action against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in 2009 (see Table 4).

Table 4: District-wise number of IDPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Families</th>
<th>Individuals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Swabi</td>
<td>97,036</td>
<td>586,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardan</td>
<td>252,813</td>
<td>2,074,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charsadda</td>
<td>25,899</td>
<td>155,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohat</td>
<td>3,169</td>
<td>42,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nowshera</td>
<td>25,323</td>
<td>158,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshawar</td>
<td>58,283</td>
<td>373,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>462,523</td>
<td>3,390,236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although peace in Malakand was partially restored during the latter part of 2009, leading to a considerable improvement in the law and order situation (HRCP, 2010), the reconstruction process started at a very low pace, particularly in Swat district (Z. Shah, 2010). And today, while many IDPs have returned to their native districts, a large number remain in camps or urban areas: according to an April 2012 update from the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), there are still around 545,000 displaced individuals in KP and FATA, approximately 160,000 of whom have been displaced since January 2012 (because of ‘security operations’) (UNICEF, 2012: 1). It is estimated that over half of these are children.

Damage to buildings and physical infrastructure has been extensive. A Swat livelihoods assessment report published by HOPE 87 (2010: 26) found that 14.3 percent of buildings in the district had been structurally damaged, stating that the:

[M]id-conflict phase resulted in huge collateral damage during the peace agreement between militants and Government of Pakistan. The militants not only brutally destroyed the valuable individual and community assets of the area but also burnt and demolished the public and private buildings and physical assets.

Flooding in the region has also caused substantial physical damage. According to the joint donor/government DNA of the floods, KP was the second most badly affected province in Pakistan, after Sindh (ADB and World Bank, 2010). Estimated flood damage in the province amounted to USD 1.17 billion, or just over 11 percent of the total national damage. In terms of damage in sectors directly linked to the MDGs, 5.6 percent of pre-flood educational facilities in KP suffered damage (either partial or total destruction of buildings and infrastructure); 11 percent of health facilities were similarly...
affected. Direct damage to housing stock was also significant in KP, with losses monetised at about USD 163.8 million. Damage to water and sanitation infrastructure was estimated at about USD 5.6 million. In addition to the infrastructural damage, the loss of livelihoods was devastating for the province. The DNA estimated that 50 percent agricultural livelihoods were affected as a result of the floods, while early flash floods killed over 72,000 large and 67,000 small animals, in addition to more than 600,000 heads of poultry in the province.

Although many households and communities in KP and FATA were already fairly vulnerable to various detrimental livelihood outcomes before the worst of the crises hit, most were nonetheless in a position to manage their finances in a relatively secure manner. A survey conducted in Swat showed that most households were able to cover the costs of food, utilities, education, health and transportation by themselves during the pre-conflict period (Khan, 2009). Conflict and floods have changed this for many people, by severely constraining households’ ability to secure a stable and decent income. According to a rapid assessment for Save the Children, based on a survey of 123 households in 11 villages:

> In the assessed villages, the most severe impact from the recent operation against the militants has been the decline in household incomes. This was consistently noted across almost all sectors, and in particular for agriculture, which is the economic mainstay for a large proportion of the population in the district. With the sluggish condition of the local economy and present state of uncertainty, more and more households have been pushed to the economic brink, especially the medium and lower income groups who have limited economic opportunities and purchasing capacities (Khan, 2009: 26).

As mentioned previously, many if not most households in KP and FATA practise agriculture. HOPE 87 (2010) surveyed regions of Swat and found that households dependent on income from orchards, farming and livestock (85 percent of the sample population) had suffered on average a 67 percent decrease in production of crops and vegetables. Furthermore, over 40 percent of households involved in agricultural production through fruit orchards on their land had lost two seasons of harvests, as they had received either no or minimal returns for the two seasons. Disruption to their farming work meant that, while their orchards required regular maintenance, such as thinning, topping, general pruning and the application of pesticides or fertilisers, they were unable to do so for two successive seasons. The survey results projected a loss of over 70 percent of harvest for the next season.

However, it is possible that that the negative impacts of reduced agricultural production on household wellbeing have been concentrated mainly in subsistence and food security, rather than in household income. Recent data (Government of KP and UNDP, 2011) show that, on average, crops and livestock constitute only 15 percent of monthly income in KP, suggesting that other sources of income are more important (e.g. international and domestic remittances constitute 18 percent of household income) and/or that livelihood diversification is widespread in the region. Given the frequency with which agriculture is discussed as a core livelihood activity in northwest Pakistan, this might be considered somewhat surprising. However, it is important to remember that agriculture in these parts is typically small scale and mainly serves the purpose of basic subsistence as opposed to income generation. Moreover, the centrality of agriculture to household income is likely to be a spatial issue, with households in certain areas depending more on agriculture than those in other areas. For example, while the 15 percent figure mentioned above refers to KP as a whole, in a 2009 rapid assessment of flood-affected communities in Swat agriculture was reported as the main source of income in 57.5 percent of communities surveyed (Save the Children, 2010).

Whether conflict and flooding in KP and FATA have affected household incomes significantly or not, one thing is certain: generally speaking, food insecurity has increased. According to WFP (2010), ‘the highest proportions of households with insufficient food consumption are found in Malakand division (58 percent) and FATA (46 percent)’ (6). About half of the population is unable to secure nutritious food at all times for everyone, and 61 percent of districts of KP do not have the necessary prerequisites for food security, that is, physical availability of food, socioeconomic access to food and food absorption (Geiser and Suleri, 2010; Suleri and Haq, 2009). Save the Children (2010) report that 54 percent of communities surveyed in Swat in 2009 had no food stock available at home.

The reasons for this are multiple, but relate primarily to problems of production and availability (Hussain and Routray, 2012; Suleri and Haq, 2009; WFP 2010) – for example, quantitative research by Khan
and Gill (2009) into the determinants of food security concludes that policies in North-west Frontier Province (NWFP) and FATA should focus on increasing food availability – and problems of access, which are turn related to both inefficient distribution systems (Hussain and Routray, 2012) and the impact of crises on agricultural markets in the region (see below).

3.2 Household coping strategies

People in conflict-affected areas use different strategies to cope with shocks and stressors, with such strategies usually dependent on the severity and duration of the problem. In crisis-affected areas of KP, households have generally adopted four types of strategies: (i) reducing household net worth or increasing borrowing; (ii) increasing household labour supply; (iii) reducing food consumption; and (iv) using the support provided by different agencies (World Bank, 2010).

Households are typically more prepared to incur debts before resorting to more drastic measures such as selling assets, removing children from school or seeking additional employment (WFP, 2010). For instance, in conflict areas of KP and FATA, about 90 percent of the IDP and returnee population surveyed had been compelled to borrow money over the past year to cope with cash shortages (ibid.). Even more revealing are the reasons why families incurred debt to begin with. In 80 percent of current IDP households, money was borrowed in order to purchase food. To identify other coping strategies, households were asked how they dealt with problems experienced in meeting basic needs. The most common responses were about limiting meal sizes and restricting overall intake by adult family members (ibid.).

Approximately 90 percent of the combined IDP and returnee population were compelled to borrow money over the last year, in order to cope with cash shortages; compared to only 64 percent of past hot spot residents and 82 percent of other households. Perhaps even more revealing are the reasons why families incurred debt to begin with. In 80 percent of current IDP households, money was borrowed in order to purchase food (significantly higher than the 45 percent across other household categories). The second highest response related to settling health expenses, while only 23 percent of current host respondents are actually using borrowed capital to invest in livelihoods, agricultural inputs or property repairs [...]. In order to identify other coping strategies, households were asked how they dealt with problems experienced in meeting basic food and non-food needs. In varying degrees, the most common responses related to limiting meal sizes and restricting overall intake by adult family members. It was observed, however that IDP household are making the greatest compromises on their dietary intake (at 57 percent) (WFP, 2010: 43).

Coping strategies are often economically (and sometimes socially) damaging to households. Aside from increasing debt and heightening the risk of malnutrition by changing or reducing food intake, household coping strategies can result in a drastic restructuring of asset bases, which may take years to recover. Surveys in Swat reveal that many households had experienced an average 69 percent decrease in livestock during the conflict (HOPE 87, 2010), for two main reasons: first, villagers could not feed animals as a result of declining production (note here the interlinked, often compounding nature of the effects of shocks); and second, people had sold livestock in order to either manage daily expenses or finance migration. The financial implications of livestock losses are significant, particularly for poorer households: a rapid assessment report of Swat by Save the Children found that the average estimated loss of livestock per household amounted to Rs 139,268 (USD 1,678) (Khan, 2009). In the context of average household monthly income losses of 73 percent (ibid.), this represents a serious impact on a household’s asset base.

Three recent studies offer important insights into household recovery following the floods and conflict in KP. In-depth qualitative research by A. Shah (2010) has explored the livelihood trajectories of 24 households in three villages in Swat, finding that only seven have been able to cope with the multiple shocks of armed conflict and flooding, citing international remittances, wealth (i.e. assets), employment with the government and political connections as key factors for maintaining livelihood security. Conversely, factors that undermine livelihood security include a lack of livelihood diversification, losses in human capital (especially to males) and the loss or sale of livestock (see above discussion on negative coping strategies). Shah’s study also highlights the marginality of official relief assistance to households’ recovery prospects: the majority of surveyed households had received some form of assistance yet were still experiencing declining livelihood security, suggesting the amount of assistance
received was inadequate to cover household needs (however, aid capture by traditional village leaders (malaks) was also reported by some households) (A. Shah, 2010: 52–7).

Two other studies, by Kurosaki and Khan (2011) and Kurosaki et al. (2012), shed light on the recovery of flood-affected households in KP. The real value of these studies is that the 2012 report is based on a second survey carried out one year after the initial pilot survey, thus providing insights into the actual process of recovery.

The first of the two studies is based on a pilot survey carried out in December 2010 to February 2011 to analyse the impact of the flooding. Drawing on a cross-sectional sample of 100 households from 10 villages, the authors find significant between- and in-village differences in recovery levels. Recovery appears to have been facilitated by a higher level of initial (i.e. pre-flood) assets and does not appear to have been influenced by receipt of aid. In addition, recovery levels were higher for crops than for houses, land and livestock, and – perhaps unsurprisingly – households that experienced greater flood damage found it more difficult to recover. In terms of coping strategies, the survey data point to the importance of mutual insurance and self-insurance mechanisms, such as reciprocity-based transactions or sale of assets. On the other hand, there was not a single case of a household using migration or reducing children’s schooling as a response to the flooding (Kurosaki and Khan, 2011).

The second, follow-up study explores whether the correlates of household recovery had changed after one year. A number of continuities are identified: initial human capital assets still facilitate recovery and flood damage still slows recovery (although they are now less statistically significant). Overall recovery had improved, but the extent varied substantially across households in line with the aforementioned correlates. Broadly speaking, there is:

[...] no clear evidence that the 2010 floods destroyed human or social capital or changed the way in which human and physical assets translate into household well-being [...] [The] resulting turbulence [from the floods] did not result in a transition to a new regime with a completely different distribution of welfare levels and livelihood assets; instead, the rural economy seems to be recovering to the initial regime’ (Kurosaki et al., 2012: 11).

It must be pointed out that, although interesting, insightful and valid, none of the three studies just discussed is based on representative sampling, so their findings must be handled with caution and in recognition of their limits.

3.3 Markets and livelihoods

A report produced in early 2012 (Nyborg et al., 2012) cited research undertaken by the Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy in April 2009 to estimate that agricultural output losses in Swat as a result of the conflict were approximately Rs 4 billion annually in 2008 and 2009. When compared with an estimated pre-war output of Rs 9 billion, this amounts to a loss of 44 percent. In addition, while the farming sector had previously employed over 50 percent of the labour force in Swat, during and after the conflict around one-third of these workers lost their income.

War has led to the physical destruction of markets and transport infrastructure, including shops, storage of space, transport vehicles and roads. FATA has undoubtedly suffered the greatest damage (WFP, 2010). Overall, 80 percent of surveyed markets have been affected by insecurity, 70 percent by military operations and two-thirds by looting. Traders’ access to 43 percent of markets has been inhibited and, as in FATA, increased transaction costs are a major problem (ibid.).

In conflict-affected areas of KP and FATA, traders have adopted coping strategies that are likely to have been harmful to consumers (WFP, 2010). A total of 32 percent of traders interviewed in WFP (2010) had increased their prices, and the first reaction was to reduce their scale of operation, mainly as a means of minimising losses in the case of looting (reported by 81 percent of traders). Second, three-quarters had reduced their business costs, by taking advantage of, for example, quick stock rotation opportunities offered by high demand in Afghanistan, rather than handling costly stocks in FATA. Finally, two-thirds of traders had offered less credit to customers. These coping strategies have further compromised the ability of households to purchase food and sales volumes decrease. Bari (2010) concluded that terrorism/Talibanisation had destroyed not only the local infrastructure but also local...
rural and urban economies. Both men and women have suffered a loss of resources, livelihoods, jobs, income from agriculture and business because of ongoing conflict in their area. Women have been further affected in gender-specific ways, given their traditional roles as mothers and caregivers. With the loss of a family income, the burden of feeding family members with little or no income has weighed heavy on them.

Recent studies suggest that terrorism has greatly affected the economy of Pakistan in general and KP and FATA in particular. The Social Development Policy Centre (SDPC) estimates the total (direct and indirect) costs of terrorism to the national economy in 2009 to 2010 at USD 10 billion (SDPC, 2010). More locally, recent statistical research by Hussain et al. (2012) likewise finds that the tourism industry in Swat and Malakand has been severely damaged.

The private sector, particularly manufacturing, also provides a source of livelihoods, but in conflict-affected areas of Swat this sector has been badly damaged. Likewise, mining has also been affected: ‘ongoing militancy has also caused great damage to the mining activities’ (Haq 2009: 91).

3.4 Gender and horizontal inequalities

In conflict- and flood-affected areas of KP and FATA, women are mainly responsible for managing the household, collecting firewood, fetching water and raising livestock. However, they are traditionally limited in their mobility within the public sphere. Only those in poorer households tend to be involved in agricultural work, typically through necessity rather than presence of more liberal norms. During focus group discussions conducted by WFP (2010), women discussed the changes they had observed in their lives over the previous year, including increased restrictions on movement because of the crisis. In Malakand division, the situation has normalised somewhat, although women in some areas have yet to resume all activities. In FATA, women reported that their movement remained more restricted than before the crisis (ibid.).

Gender analysis in conflict disaster recovery is essential in not only proactively addressing gender inequalities that increase after a disaster, but also in ensuring sustainable recovery that improves gender equality. In addition, a society’s ability to recover from a disaster is determined by its internal strength and weaknesses. Capacity to cope with a disaster varies by social conditions; gender cuts across all types of such conditions and has been found to be a root cause of social vulnerability to disasters (Briceno, 2002).

The vulnerability of women is much greater because of their subordinate position in the family arising out of patriarchy and traditionally embedded cultural values. This is reflected in unequal work burden due to productive as well as reproductive responsibility, lack of control over the means of production, restricted mobility, limited facilities for education and lack of employment, inequalities in food intake relative to men, etc.’ (Briceno, 2002: 3).

An approach to disaster recovery that allows equal participation of women and men in planning and implementing policies can increase utilisation of talent and understanding of needs, roles and future sustainability.

As noted earlier, disasters generally make existing inequalities even worse, especially for women. If disaster relief remains gender-neutral, women are subject to a number of unsafe and inhumane conditions. Sexual violence increases in the aftermath of disasters if protection measures are not in place. Women are forced to give birth in unsafe conditions; infants become malnourished as a result of mothers’ malnourishment; widows and female-headed households are unable to restore livelihoods because employment generation assistance focuses on areas that predominantly employ men; and women and female-headed households are unable to access food and other aid owing to restrictions on their personal movements. In addition, because of their roles as caregivers, women are often responsible for gaining access to food and water for their entire families. If safe access is inexistent, then entire families suffer (Gomez, 2006). While gender analysis should look at both women and men’s needs, the pre-existing conditions in Pakistan provide the foundation for assessing whether women’s needs require particular consideration.
4 Multidimensional responses to the crises in KP and FATA

4.1 Institutional arrangements

Because it is considered a frontline country in the War on Terror, Pakistan has remained one of the highest recipients of international aid, and most of the aid inflows are associated with geopolitical priorities and concerns with the law and order situation inside the country (Ahmed and Wahab, 2010). However, as noted previously, the per capita level of support from external sources is actually quite modest – less than 2 percent of GDP. Overall, the Planning Commission at the federal level is coordinating donor support (World Bank, 2010). A Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) was established in October 2008 to promote disaster preparedness and management within KP. In May 2009, the federal government created a Special Support Group (SSG) under the Prime Minister’s Secretariat to guide and coordinate all activities regarding emergency assistance for displaced people in conflict-affected areas (Government of KP, 2011). The Provincial Relief, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority (PaRRSA) was created in 2009 under the umbrella of the PDMA as a mechanism to coordinate relief, recovery and reconstruction activities in crisis-affected areas (Government of KP, 2011; Haq, 2009; WFP, 2010). The military is also supporting PaRRSA through the SSG. PaRRSA has been entrusted with taking up projects proposed under the various support funds created by the Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FODP) and other international partners including international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Government of KP, 2011).

Boxes 1 and 2 outline, respectively, the government of KP’s medium-term development strategy until 2017 and the key implementation mechanisms for aid.


The Comprehensive Development Strategy seeks to delineate clear medium-term goals for the provincial government of KP. It proposes to achieve poverty reduction and employment creation through the following measures:

- Provision of basic public goods;
- Promoting competition through ‘modern regulation’;
- Improving technical and vocational skills (i.e. capacity-building);
- Facilitating the private sector.


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2 This section draws on Geiser and Suleri (2010).
3 The task of the Pakistan Planning Commission is to formulate national strategic, annual and long-term development plans and to monitor and evaluate major development projects (see http://www.pc.gov.pk/).
4 National Disaster Management Ordinance 2006 provides a legal basis for PDMA (see www.pdma.gov.pk/About_PDMA.php).
PaRRSA has extended support to displaced persons in the form of food, cash grants and transport. However, a survey conducted by WFP in 2011 revealed that only 20 percent of the population of crisis-affected areas had received some type of assistance during the past year, therefore a significant proportion of displaced persons has yet to receive support (WFP, 2010).

To generate assistance and aid from the developed world, a forum, the FODP, was formed, consisting of participants from the US, China, the UK, Saudi Arabia and the European Union (EU), among others. However, this has not been able to provide sufficient support to restore people’s livelihoods in conflict-affected situations. With support from a range of international donors, the World Bank established a Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for crisis-affected areas of KP, FATA and Baluchistan. This is mobilising international development aid to finance critical investments in support of reconstruction and peace-building (World Bank, 2010).

A critical challenge for the administration of aid in conflict-affected areas of KP is the weak local governance structure (the local government), which became even weaker when the tenure of local governments came to an end in 2010. A system of local government was introduced in 2001, giving districts more power in development affairs. Currently, administrators from the state bureaucracy are running the local administration, and this means there is little or no room for local people’s voice in the priorities or processes for delivery of different types of assistance in post-conflict settings (Geiser and Suleri, 2010).

4.2 International and national aid actors

National and international aid agencies have been relatively quick to respond the crisis in KP (see Annex 2 for a comprehensive overview of projects being implemented in Malakand division). The government of KP was able to complete the first ever DNA exercise in Malakand division through the PDMA/PaRRSA and in collaboration with the World Bank and ADB (Government of KP, 2011).

 Assistance has been provided by a range of UN and other multilateral, bilateral and humanitarian agencies. The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF, Save the Children, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), USAID, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and humanitarian agencies
have collaborated to provide assistance to those displaced by the crisis (Petter et al., 2011; World Bank, 2010). FAO has worked in emergency assistance and the immediate protection of livelihoods and food security of vulnerable households though the provision of critical livestock and agricultural inputs.

Many UN agencies, such as UNDP, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) have helped to coordinate relief efforts and provided other support services. UNICEF, UNIFEM and UNHCR have provided emergency interventions to assist vulnerable children and reduce gender-based discrimination (World Bank, 2010). In March 2011, UNDP assumed responsibility for coordinating, together with the government of Pakistan, the early recovery phase of the flood response. However, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) continues to facilitate the coordination of the response to the conflict-induced humanitarian situation in KP and FATA (CIDA, 2011). CARE International and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) have launched a major project on Emergency Relief for Conflict-affected IDPs in KP (Government of KP, 2011). USAID has launched multimillion-dollar interventions for school reconstruction, provision of health services and cash grants. Islamic Relief, a charity organisation, has also undertaken major relief and support interventions in conflict-affected areas of KP. The government of KP prepared an Early Recovery Plan for Malakand division, at an estimated cost of almost Rs 22 billion; afterwards, the Swat Development Package was approved, consisting of development projects in that district costing about Rs 1 billion (Haq, 2009).

The security situation has meant that different international aid agencies have reported some constraints regarding working in conflict- and flood-affected areas in Malakand and FATA. For example, one evaluation in 2007 reports that:

The UN, and the international humanitarian community as a whole, faced constraints in their response caused partly by funding issues and delay, and partly by NDMA’s concerns about the safety and security of non-national personnel, and the difficulty of obtaining NOCs (nonobjection certificates) for travel to the affected areas (Young et al., 2007: 9).

International agencies also face threats from extremists:

In February 2008, armed men opened fire and hurled grenades at the office of a British-run aid agency (Plan International) in Mansehra, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Four people were killed in the incident and ten wounded. This region of Pakistan is known to possess pro-Taliban militants, who have bombed the offices of NGOs in the past, alleging that IDAs are trying to undermine their version of true Islam (Ahmed, 2011: 6).

The Inter-agency Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the 2010 Floods in Pakistan states that aid governance leaves much to be desired (Polastro et al., 2011). It also reports that agencies were provided with a list of beneficiaries, as they were not allowed to visit areas of ongoing conflict. One criticism is that these beneficiaries were usually selected on the basis of political alliances. Another concern is that the transaction cost of agencies was too high and the percentage of funds reaching the affected was low. The evaluation also suggests that the various need assessments carried out after the floods lacked coordination; more could have been achieved if these assessments were channelled into designing responses. This shows some of the major flaws in the planning and coordination of the response; while speed is important, coordination and effectiveness are equally necessary, through a joint prioritisation exercise carried out by all agencies so that the most vulnerable of segments get help first. Subsequent appeals also failed because the initial needs assessment were dubious.

The following subsection discusses some of the assessments and efforts of different aid agencies.

4.3 Aid and basic services

State and international aid agencies have set their priorities for the rehabilitation of the conflict-affected areas of the province. For instance, the government conducted a Post-crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA) in 2010 in collaboration with donors (ADB et al., 2010). Waseem (2011) emphasised that international donors should initiate large-scale consortium-based projects dealing with governance-related issues
such as access to clean water, education, medical aid, justice, public transport, etc., rather than local developmental projects. Azam et al. (2009) identified the capacity-building gap for effective NGO operations and community participation. The government of NWFP prepared a stabilising strategy for Malakand:

This Comprehensive Strategy for Malakand’s stabilisation and socio-economic development sets out a clear path that aims to benefit all the people of Malakand Division. It seeks to address the underlying grievances fuelling the severe unrest and to realise human rights for women and men through partnerships between the government, civil society and the private sector’ (Government of NWFP, 2009: 3).

The humanitarian situation today in many parts of KP and FATA remains a concern, particularly for displaced persons. International NGOs continue to deliver basic services in increasingly crowded camps, but in some places, such as Jalozai Camp, ‘the capacity to deliver humanitarian services [...] is overstretched’ (UNICEF, 2012: 2). This speaks to the importance of finding institutional arrangements that work and the ability of aid actors to respond flexibly in dynamic, ever-changing environments.

4.3.1 Education

The education sector is among those that have been severely affected by conflict and the War on Terror in KP and FATA. In KP, 491 government primary schools were temporarily closed in 2009: of these, 25 percent (120 closed schools) were in Swat district, mostly because of violent conflict (Sylla, 2011). Threats by militants have also resulted in the closure of schools (particularly those for girls). WFP (2010) conducted a survey of 25 villages in Swat and found that 20 schools (mainly girls’ facilities) had been closed for two to six months over the previous year, because of threats, army operations or insecurity. By January 2009, more than 180 government schools in Swat had incurred significant damage, depriving some 80,000 female students of education. The total number of government schools and colleges in crisis-affected districts of Malakand and FATA region was 5,347 and 992, respectively (ADB and World Bank, 2009). Out of these schools, 409 and 64 were damaged in Malakand and FATA, respectively (see Table 5). Out of the total number of damaged schools, 237 were completely damaged and 190 were partially damaged. This includes 149 completely damaged and 65 partially damaged girls’ schools (Government of Pakistan, 2009). The most affected district was Swat, with a reported 276 damaged schools, out of which 167 were girls’ schools.

Table 5: Education – physical damage assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Total schools</th>
<th>Damaged schools</th>
<th>Total cost in million US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>5,347</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>33.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,339</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>38.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government of Pakistan (2009)

According to the PCNA:

Communities viewed the high levels of illiteracy stemming from lack of access to education as a major contributor to the vulnerability of populations against the rhetoric and predation of extremist elements. Unregistered, extremist madrassas are a broadly cited dimension of extremism in the northwest frontier region and were widely viewed by communities as a central platform from which militants draw recruits. However, it has also been recognised that many madrassas adhering to curricular standards perform an invaluable social function where there are no schools or for families unable to afford education, and as such need consideration as part of the solution (Government of Pakistan, 2010: 36).

Moreover, recent experimental evidence (although not from KP or FATA) casts doubt on the widespread perception that madrassas ‘teach hatred and narrow worldviews’, and instead suggests that students enrolled at madrassas exhibit higher levels of trust and altruism than students at other kinds of academic institution (Delavande and Zafar, 2011).
In terms of the impacts of forced migration, UNESCO (2010a) reports that although internal displacement was mostly concluded within three months, there was a noticeable continuing effect on pupil numbers, with overall enrolment declining by nearly 11 percent. The decline disproportionately affected female pupils, who saw a 14.7 percent decline in enrolment, compared with 8.0 percent for male pupils. The second round of fighting in Swat, which took place in the spring of 2009, reportedly resulted in the displacement of some 3 million people (nearly four times more than that of previous conflict). Because the district has one of the highest recorded literacy rates in KP, Swat has been subject to militant threats against schools since 2008 (WFP, 2010).

Reconstruction and rehabilitation of the education sector has been slow paced, according to Zafar (2011). Out of a total 397 destroyed schools in Swat, the government had laid the foundations for only 20 schools by early 2010. Nevertheless, USAID has committed to rebuilding 120 schools in Malakand, while the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Save the Children are working to recover about 40 schools in the division. The Pakistani Army has issued an amount of Rs 50 million to the provincial government for the reconstruction of schools (Government of KP, 2011). USAID also renovated 150 schools by establishing libraries, providing training to heads of schools, equipping science labs, providing furniture and renovating classrooms in Malakand division from February to September 2011, at a project cost of USD 10 million (USAID, 2010). Specific projects have also been launched to provide education facilities to displaced persons (UNESCO, 2010b).

Regarding gender impacts, Bari (2010) gathered quantitative and qualitative data from IDPs in Malakand and FATA and conclude that one of the most important social impacts of terrorism and Talibanisation, mentioned by 51 percent of women and 53 percent of men, has been lack of access to education. Educational institutions in general and women’s schools in particular have been attacked, bombed or destroyed because of a perception of modern education as a threat to religious orthodoxy. The Taliban has destroyed 120 girls and 80 other schools in Swat Valley alone.

Today, there are 32,276 schools in KP. Of these, 24,719 (77 percent) are primary schools, with 7,858 for girls and 2,010 co-educational. Middle schools comprise 14 percent, while secondary and higher secondary schools comprise 10 percent and 2 percent, respectively (Mustafa, 2012). Enrolment and attendance rates are skewed both by gender – for example, Khan (2009) finds that, while 78 percent of boys in surveyed households in Swat are attending school, only 61 percent of girls are – and geography (between rural and urban areas and also within and between districts). In rural Kohistan, the primary completion rate for girls is a mere 1 percent, compared with 25 percent for boys, and, although rates are higher in urban areas, the gender gaps persists (Mustafa, 2012).

Delivering education services in the context of ongoing violence and insecurity is hugely challenging and very risky. Harmer et al. (2010) reflect on the specific difficulties facing aid agencies and workers attempting to deliver education in conflict-affected parts of Pakistan and across the border in Afghanistan:

Aiding education in conflict is a complex and politically charged endeavour for aid workers. Often associated with the state and the “state-building” project, it can strain the ability of aid workers to maintain the perception of neutrality and impartiality. More important, it is potentially dangerous, particularly in contexts where extremist groups are conducting systematic attacks against school infrastructure, teachers, and students. This trend of violence against education has been identified...in Pakistan for the past two [years]. It comes at a time when both countries [Pakistan and Afghanistan] have witnessed rising numbers of attacks against aid workers generally. While the current evidence base may not be sufficient to conclude positively that aid workers delivering education are more vulnerable to attack than those delivering other basic social services such as health, it is clearly a sector which faces significant and distinctive risk (Harmer et al., 2010: 22–3).

The challenges facing aid agencies delivering education in KP are compounded by the problematic state of education across the province as a whole. Despite efforts by the government, access to education remains a huge problem for many, and the quality of the service has also been questioned (Mustafa, 2012).
4.3.2 Health

Prior to the crises, health facilities in KP and FATA already suffered from a lack of equipment, medicines and other essential supplies. Moreover, the Provincial Department of Health supplies medicines on a quota basis, with no consideration for needs, seasonal variations, disease outbreaks and so on (Government of Pakistan, 2010). As a result of conflict, 30 percent of health facilities in Malakand division and 16 percent in the two FATA agencies of Mohmand and Bajaur had been significantly damaged by mid-2009 (WFP, 2010). According to the DNA, 61 health facilities were reported as damaged in Malakand (Government of KP, 2011).

Apart from the damage to medical facilities, access of health staff (especially lady health workers) has been severely restricted, and medical supplies have become scarce in Malakand and FATA. Women typically attend health centres during pregnancy, during critical situations or when their children fall ill. In many areas, however, male community members or militants have prohibited women from leaving their homes without a male escort, and in some cases entirely. In addition, long curfews have prevented families from visiting facilities, even for emergency cases. Unsurprisingly, the situation has been more problematic for women, who are generally limited in their access because of poverty, cultural norms or a lack of female staff; these obstacles severely affect their use of natal care and other related services (WFP, 2010).

A number of recent studies have assessed the health situation of displaced persons in Pakistan in general and in KP and Swat in particular. These studies focus primarily on the physical health status of IDPs and the support that is or was available to them. Findings generally suggest that availability of and access to health services have been and continue to be a major problem for IDPs.

Bari (2010) conducted quantitative and qualitative research with IDPs from FATA and Malakand, finding that 58 percent of men and 54 percent of women reported that a lack of access to health care facilities had impacted them the most severely. Providing insights into the gendered nature of access to health care, she showed that not only was there a shortage of drugs, non-availability of necessary medical equipment and a lack of medical staff in the conflict area, but also the Taliban imposed additional restrictions on female patients consulting male doctors. This created serious health risks for women in areas where there were very low numbers of female doctors.

A lack of social services can also affect the psychosocial health and wellbeing of displaced individuals. Irfan et al. (2011) conducted a cross-sectional questionnaire of 128 family heads in Jalalah Camp (Mardan district) in 2009 in order to identify the kinds of psychosocial services available. They found that availability of social services varied widely, with relatively good provision of schools, mosques and recreational facilities for children and relatively poor provision of funeral services, graveyards and spaces for community celebrations. In addition, only 12 percent of families reported being informed by the camp administration about the situation in their hometown.

A mixture of actors is involved in providing health services. For example, Khan (2009) found that, in the absence of public health care, 50 percent of households surveyed used private doctors. Furthermore, only 36 percent of surveyed villages had a health facility nearby. This is despite increases in public expenditure on health over recent years (see Figure 3 in section 4.5).

Drawing on data from focus groups with local lady health workers, Dykes et al. (forthcoming) explore some of the challenges in optimising maternal and infant nutrition in rural KP, identifying a series of structural barriers, including poverty, gender inequality leading to limited access to food for women, lack of education for women and cultural taboos and beliefs. Despite these problems, however, the authors conclude that the provision of lady health workers and the implementation of nutrition support programmes that enhance knowledge and improve practice are viable policy options in the KP context.

4.3.3 Water and sanitation

According to the Pakistan Social and Living Standard Living Survey (2008 to 2009), the majority of families in rural areas do not have access to sufficient clean drinking water. Many households also lack toilets and adequate sanitation systems. To improve sanitation in rural areas, the government is trying to promote the construction of household latrines and street water drainage systems. (Government of Pakistan, 2008)
In the five affected districts of Malakand, about 30 percent (451 out of 1,508) water supply schemes have been completely or partially damaged; 111 are completely damaged and 340 are partially damaged. Most completely damaged schemes are hand pumps, tube wells, open wells and protected springs. A total of 100 of 201 damaged tube-well based schemes are in Swat district. (ADB and World Bank, 2009). Widespread damage to existing water supply schemes in conflict-affected areas affects the availability of clean water for sanitation and drinking purposes.

Besides this lack of basic sanitation and water facilities, access to proper water storage systems and basic hygiene elements is inadequate. Moreover, target populations rarely treat their drinking water, and practical hygiene awareness is low (HRDS, 2010). Rapid assessment surveys of flood- and conflict-affected households confirm these general trends. In Swat, for example, Save the Children (2010) report that 45 percent of surveyed communities are using rivers, ponds and lakes as their main water source, and that only 28 percent of surveyed households have access to functioning latrines. However, the extent of physical damage to water sources by conflict is not altogether clear. For example, Khan (2009) found that drinking water sources had suffered comparatively less damage than electricity, communications and police services in Swat, suggesting that the state of water services was already fairly poor prior to the conflict.

4.3.4 Social protection and social safety nets
There is an emerging global consensus on the utility of providing financial support to food-insecure groups and households, owing to their vulnerability to shocks and stressors (Hamelin et al., 2008). Many developing countries are following this global trend, with such efforts based on the philosophy that food insecurity is caused by ‘declining incomes’ (Babu and Tashmatov, 2006) and that support structures (social safety nets) will contribute towards achieving food security in conflict-affected areas.

There is an increasingly serious problem of food scarcity in many areas of Pakistan, where almost 21 million people are facing food insecurity and threats like malnutrition, under-nutrition and hunger. Conflict-affected areas of KP and Baluchistan are listed as severely lacking in food security. In KP, 12 out of 24 districts are severely lacking food security and access to food is said to have become a major problem (Suleri, 2010a). Broader macroeconomic growth policies take a long time to trickle down benefits to poor communities; to mitigate this situation, there is a need for efficient safety nets to ensure the food security and survival of the sizeable population of very poor people in Pakistan (Syed, 2009).

Gazdar (2011) considers whether social protection in Pakistan is in the midst of a paradigm shift. Having emerged in 2008 as a central policy concern, social protection has since broadened and expanded as part of a wider attempt to mitigate risk and reduce vulnerability at the household level throughout the country (the Government’s National Social Protection Strategy 2007 frames social protection mostly in terms of risk mitigation; ibid.). Indeed, in financial year 2008/09, the fiscal allocation to cash transfer programmes in Pakistan increased nearly six-fold, and in recent years the country has more than doubled its social safety net spending to GDP ratio, from 0.4 percent to almost 1.0 percent (Grosh et al., 2011). Generally speaking, there has been tremendous progress over the past few years; in particular, assigning women as the primary beneficiaries of certain large-scale cash transfer programmes ‘can hardly be overstated in a highly patriarchal society such as Pakistan’ (Gazdar, 2011: 13). Yet, in order for a true ‘paradigm shift’ in social protection to occur, the author argues that broader improvements in state–society relations must come first. Although Gazdar’s report refers mainly to social protection programming at the national level, the trends observed are of relevance to what has happened in KP and FATA in recent years in terms of policy response.

In terms of coverage, WFP (2010) conducted a household survey and focus group discussions in conflict-affected areas of KP and concluded that cash grant projects and government compensation initiatives were quite extensive. This survey estimates that 1.6 million people received some form of cash support, through the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal (PBM) and government compensation schemes or, in fewer cases, zakat.

However, recent data suggest that, at the national level, poverty-targeted social protection coverage is fairly dire. As Figure 2 shows, regionally, Pakistan is trailing by a long way when it comes to the share of its poor receiving social protection. Of course, as pointed out by Gazdar (2011) and Grosh et al. (2011),
Pakistan’s social protection system has expanded quite dramatically since 2008 (when the data were produced), so it is entirely possible that the figures would look quite different now.

Figure 2: Share of the poor receiving social protection across Asia region, by country, 2008 (percent)

Several types of intervention are regarded as social safety nets, such as cash transfers, which include zakat, ushar, PBM, BISP, conditional cash transfers (incentive payments for the poor to make use of health and education), old age income security, which includes pensions for government employees and employees’ old age benefit institutions, microcredit and NGO programmes, which include the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund, Khushhali Bank, rural support programmes, etc. Employment-based programmes include workers’ welfare funds, programmes of various foundations, public works programmes, food-based programmes, school meals, wheat subsidies and social security. Pakistan’s National Database and Registration Authority had also given debit (watan) cards to over 900,000 families as of September 2010 (Kronstadt et al., 2010; UNHCR, 2011). The aim is to provide USD 1,150 dollars to each head of household through these cards in three separate disbursements to help families recover from the floods.

A recent review examines the degree of and potential for integration between social protection, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation projects in South Asia (Arnall et al., 2010). The authors identified and reviewed 16 relevant agriculture/food security programmes within Pakistan and found that, of these, 34 percent combined social protection and disaster risk reduction approaches – a higher proportion than in all four other countries assessed (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal). The report points out that Pakistan already has considerable experience of using social protection approaches in its earthquake-affected areas, but that greater integration is constrained by a fragmented social protection policy environment and a limited policy focus on climate change.

On a similar note, Grosh et al. (2011) apply the World Bank’s Safety Net Readiness Framework to Pakistan (along with a number of other South and Central Asian countries) and find that, in relation to food price volatility in 2011, the country has a ‘moderate’ basis for response, meaning there is one or

more operating and progressively targeted programme to build on, but with less than full coverage and/or in need of administrative improvements.

We briefly discuss below a selection of social protection initiatives prominent in KP and FATA.

4.3.4.1 Benazir Income Support Programme
BISP is a large-scale, state-run cash transfer programme. Such programmes can be used for emergency purposes in periods of crisis or for short- or medium-term poverty alleviation (Tabor, 2002). BISP, launched as a response to high food prices, comprises cash grants of Rs 1,000 per month, disbursed every two months to women in households with a monthly income of less than Rs 6,000. Coverage of the scheme includes FATA, with special attention to remote areas such as North and South Waziristan (WFP, 2010). BISP is focused on the needs of the ‘poorest of the poor’ of society, not only in terms of cash assistance for day-to-day subsistence but also enabling them to exit the vicious cycle of poverty. In financial year 2008/09, a total of Rs 14 billion was disbursed to 1.76 million beneficiaries in the shape of the cash grant (Government of Pakistan, 2010). An amount of Rs 70 million was allocated in 2009/10 to target 5 million families. Expenditures amounting to Rs 17.8 billion were incurred up till March 2010. For 2009/10, the budget for BISP was expanded to Rs 84 billion and coverage increased to 7 million families (WFP, 2010). Over the next five years, the programme aims to reach 40 percent of those living below the poverty line nationally (15 percent of the population) (Grosh et al., 2011).

It is particularly significant to note that, although BISP was initially set up as a special project under the government’s annual development plan, within the course of one year it had already been brought under its own law and established as a programme with funding from the cabinet division (Gazdar, 2011). This hints at not only the high level of policy commitment to BISP, but also the (perceived) popularity of the programme among Pakistani citizens. That said, it remains to be seen whether BISP will evolve from a relatively short-term response to crisis into a ‘full-blown social protection institution with multiple dimensions including exit programmes, emergency relief and health insurance’ (ibid.: 12).

4.3.4.2 Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal
PBM disburses cash to the destitute, the needy, widows, orphans, invalids and the infirm irrespective of their gender, caste, creed or race. It provides assistance under different programmes and schemes such as the Food Support Programme, Individual Financial Assistance, Institutional Rehabilitation through Civil Society Wing, the National Centre for Rehabilitation of Child Labour and vocational training institutes/dastkari schools. An amount of Rs 1.65 billion was disbursed during financial year 2009/10 (July to March), relative to Rs 2.7 billion in the corresponding period of 2008/09, marking a decrease of 38.9 percent. This reflects a decline in the number of beneficiaries by 22.8 percent, from 1,437,569 to 1,110,264 over the same period (Government of Pakistan, 2010).

Cash transfers through the Food Support Programme are disbursed immediately after the wheat harvest season, helping recipients buy wheat when prices are lowest. It is implemented by the Ministry of Social Welfare in collaboration with the Pakistan Post Office and provincial governments. In 2008/09, about 300,000 people in KP and FATA received an annual subsidy of Rs 3,000 per household (WFP, 2010).

4.3.4.3 Zakat
Zakat is an Islamic concept of charity and alms. It is an obligation on Sunni Muslims to pay 2.5 percent of their wealth to specified categories in society when their annual wealth exceeds a minimum level. The Zakat Programme is implemented by the federal Ministry of Religious Affairs, and provides cash transfer support to eligible poor Sunni Muslim recipients through local zakat committees (WFP, 2010). The programme provides financial assistance such as the guzara (subsistence) allowance, educational stipends, health care, social welfare/rehabilitation, special grants and marriage assistance through the Regular Zakat Programme, the other Zakat Programme and national-level schemes. A total of Rs 768.7 million was disbursed under different programmes during financial year 2009/10 (July to March), compared with Rs 1,421 million in the same period of 2008/09, a decrease of 46 percent (Government of Pakistan, 2010).

Those eligible to receive zakat include the needy and the poor (especially widows and orphans), as well as people with disabilities. Two main types of support are provided – a monthly subsistence allowance
and a rehabilitation grant – which constitute about 70 percent of all support. Grants for marriage dowries and educational and medical expenses make up the remaining 30 percent (Toor and Nasar, 2003). The size of disbursements depends largely on mandatory and voluntary collections (WFP, 2010).

### 4.3.4.4 KP and FATA Emergency Recovery Project

The World Bank (together with PaRRSA) is funding and implementing an emergency recovery project to support the government of Pakistan, and more specifically the authorities in KP and FATA, in their recovery efforts. The project, established in 2011 and closing at the end of 2014, has three components: i) safety net support grants to poor and vulnerable households affected by the militancy crisis in target areas (USD 180 million); ii) conditional cash transfers for human development to poor and vulnerable households (USD 85 million); and iii) capacity-building and implementation support for post-disaster safety nets (USD 20 million). The project aims to reach 250,000 direct beneficiaries (World Bank, 2010).

### 4.4 Livelihoods restoration and support to economic recovery

Several aid agencies have funded and administered various livelihoods support programmes in KP and FATA. However, given that many of the programmes and interventions discussed in the preceding subsections relate either directly or indirectly to people’s livelihoods, we focus here more on the economics of recovery and market dynamics.

#### 4.4.1 Tourism

USAID has made efforts to revitalise the private sector in the shape of a sum of USD 5.25 million set aside for the tourism industry; USD 1.4 million will go into direct cash assistance as post-conflict, post-flood rehabilitation grants. These funds were to help create more than 1,000 jobs in 2011 for the hotel industry and directly benefit more than 10,000 people. During 2010, some 410 jobs were created, with 387 permanent and regular jobs (Tour Swat, 2011).

#### 4.4.2 Microfinance

Microfinance is recognised as an effective tool to pull the poor and vulnerable out of poverty and vulnerability. It empowers the poor, especially women, and enables them to enhance their income-earning capacity. Microfinance comprises microcredit, micro-savings and micro-insurance. It is provided as a package through microfinance banks, microfinance institutions, rural support programmes and other means, including commercial financial institutions and NGOs. Credit disbursements amounting to Rs 21.7 billion were made during financial year 2009/10 (July to December), compared with Rs 18.7 billion during the same period in 2008/09, showing an increase of 16.04 percent (Government of Pakistan, 2010).

Nouman et al. (2010) assess the availability of microfinance and its impact on economic growth in rural areas of KP. Using perception questionnaires in seven districts, the authors find that, generally, respondents are i) not satisfied with the microfinance services in their area (in terms of both sufficiency and access); and ii) not satisfied with the performance of available microfinance services. The authors conclude that microfinance has ‘failed to bring about any substantial improvement in the financial position of the locals of rural areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It has neither decreased the poverty level nor has it created any substantial activity in the areas under consideration’ (ibid.: 194). These findings and conclusions should be treated with some caution, based as they are on a small sample of just 100 respondents and derived from a short questionnaire comprising nine close-ended questions. This is not to say the study cannot shed light on the perceptions of vulnerable ‘lower class’ Pakistanis in rural KP regarding the effectiveness of microfinance and its appropriateness as a livelihood intervention. But using the study to estimate the impact of microfinance on poverty and growth in the region may be a step too far.

More recently, Saleem and Jan (2011) have estimated the impact of agricultural credit on agricultural productivity in Dera Ismail Khan district of KP using statistical data and methods. They find strong correlations between the disbursal of credit for seed, fertilisers and pesticides, irrigation and tractors and agricultural GDP.
4.4.3 Bacha Khan Poverty Alleviation Programme

BKPAP is a two-year pilot multi-sector poverty alleviation programme that was initiated in Upper Dir, Battagram, Karak and Mardan districts, with a yearly budgetary allocation of Rs 501 million to set up 1,800 rural organisations and provide training to 11,000 people and small loans to 2,600 people. The programme was designed to set up 400 irrigation and water schemes and 920 model fruit and vegetable orchards. It is being executed through a non-governmental development organisation, Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP). According to the provincial government performance report, the main components include social mobilisation, social protection and livelihoods improvement, and the programme is the first of its kind to introduce micro-insurance services for households to mitigate unforeseen social and health-related shocks. BKPAP has so far finished 37 community-owned and managed small infrastructure schemes, as well as various other schemes in the areas of skills trainings, agriculture and livestock (The News International, 2010).

Table 6 below presents basic information on expenditure and coverage of some of the main initiatives discussed above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social safety net</th>
<th>Amount disbursed (Rs) (FY 2009/10)</th>
<th>Number of beneficiaries</th>
<th>Outreach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BISP</td>
<td>32 billion</td>
<td>7 million</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBM</td>
<td>2.7 billion</td>
<td>1.11 million</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakat</td>
<td>786 million</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microcredit</td>
<td>21.7 billion</td>
<td>2 million</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BKAP</td>
<td>1,500 million (total cost)</td>
<td>11,000 trainings</td>
<td>4 districts in KP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Government of Pakistan (2011)

The losses of rural households that are engaged primarily in farming and orchard crop raising need to be reduced in various ways, including through facilitating access to new resources by providing paid labour and funding for fertilisers, pesticides and proper cutting. Cultivation of agricultural lands provides feed for livestock and thus decreases in crop production also result in decreases in livestock rearing and vice versa. For instance, Abbas and Ali (2010) note a 73 percent decrease in poultry in Charbagh tehsil of Swat district, mainly due to a lack of care, poultry diseases during conflict/displacement, and a lack of facilities, such as poultry sheds, water and medicine. Knowledge of and skills in poultry vaccination are not found at village level, which also threatens local poultry breeds.

This has made the targeting of relief, early recovery and reconstruction a complex affair, particularly for the international community. Early assessments seem to show that the targeting of aid has been inconsistent and unclear. Nyborg et al. (2012) argue that the larger infrastructural investments have been more clearly beneficial to the area, and food and livelihood support has suffered from poor assessments and biased distribution, with widespread elite capture of resources: the more vulnerable and politically or socially weaker have been unable to effectively access resources (ibid.).

It is these types of political economy issues that must be at the forefront of debates around intervention selection and programme effectiveness. Yet, many assessments and reports do not go into the messy and complicated politics of implementation and delivery. For example, the livelihood assessment by HOPE 87 (2010) provides a number of policy recommendations, most of which are technical responses intended to promote agricultural recovery. These measures are well grounded in the findings of the assessment and certainly make a great deal of sense given the context. However, programme design is as important as programme type. How an intervention is implemented has important implications for outcomes, and decision-makers need to consider how the specific dynamics of their operating environments (e.g. embedded forms of social exclusion, gender inequalities) may stifle impacts.

Moving forwards, there is perhaps some uncertainty regarding policy priorities for stimulating economic activity and economic growth in KP and FATA. A growth diagnostics exercise was carried out at national
level in financial year 2005/06 (Qayyum et al., 2008), identifying a poor state of governance, a poor state of institutions and a lack of a competitive environment as the key binding constraints on growth in Pakistan – at the time of the research, at least. But this exercise tells us little to nothing about the particular dynamics of private sector activity and the governance of markets within KP and FATA. Therefore, a sub-national growth diagnostic focusing on this region might be of value for policymakers.

4.4.4 Analysing markets and livelihoods
The structure, functions and internal dynamics of markets are key determinants of the livelihoods of poor people. In assessing how different markets have an impact on the livelihoods of communities in KP and FATA, it is necessary to consider the nature of different markets and market-related factors - including transportation, financial resources, government policies/regulations and how power holders affect market access – and how they can potentially affect livelihoods. A focus on ‘livelihoods’ without attention to these details may significantly reduce the impact of livelihood initiatives. It will also mean that assessing the impacts of conflict or disasters will be less effective.

The donor literature and plans for KP and FATA pay relatively little attention to either the private sector or key market linkages, in both the pre-disaster/development phase and ‘emergency settings’. There is often little focus on market systems and their role in the rebuilding of livelihoods. It can be argued that the processes of elaborating market relations, especially if carried out in participatory ways, can be important interventions in themselves – directly improving linkages and relationships between market chain actors and preparing the ground for introducing or generating innovation in products, processes and market access.

One example of the importance of market assessment involves shops that support agricultural and livestock production in conflict-affected areas. These shops are the source of such inputs as seeds, fertilisers, pesticides and other necessary agricultural resources for households on a credit basis during the planting season. They receive repayment at the time of the harvest and marketing of farm outputs. Shopkeepers manage and finance their operations based on seasonal credits and thus help farmers cultivate their lands annually. However, surveys of conflict-affected areas have shown that, because of the dramatic decline in agricultural outputs, these shops have had to close, leaving farmers with greater debt and the shop owners without resources to reopen (HOPE 87, 2010).

These lessons from KP and FATA indicate the importance of donors and agencies in identifying the major factors and trends shaping the market chain environment and operating conditions. They may not be easy to change, because of pre-existing politics, power relations and market structures. It is vital, though, that there is a clear understanding of ‘livelihood enabling environment' factors, generated by structures and institutions beyond the immediate direct control of poor people. The purpose of charting this environment is to understand the trends affecting the entire market chain, and to examine the powers and interests that shape the livelihoods of poor people and continue to affect livelihoods after conflict and displacement.

4.5 Effectiveness issues
It is reported in almost all qualitative interviews that governmental and NGO programmes are often influenced by elites and not easy to access. The Islamic programmes (zakat, PBM, etc.) are more easily accessible by poor people, but other government programmes are more difficult, the main reported reason being that only those who belong to the caste or party of the ruling class receive support. According to Tareen (2011), when one respondent was asked about BISP, he said it was available only for supporters of the Pakistan People Party or those who were financially sound. Lack of awareness of programmes is another factor. Meanwhile, whereas NGO support structures are perceived to be comparatively thorough, personal contacts are also an important factor affecting merit-based distribution (ibid.). A number of empirical studies add weight to the claim that aid disbursal is affected by elite capture (e.g. Kurosaki and Khan, 2011; A. Shah, 2010).

The government of Pakistan (2010) recognises that, to avoid exclusion of the poorest and most vulnerable from benefits brought through peace-building efforts, existing safety net systems (such as BISP, PBM Mal and Zakat, which do not provide full coverage in areas of crisis) need to be
complemented by a system of additional conditional and unconditional transfers, with clearly communicated specific targeting criteria and timeframes for benefits.

Shaukat et al. (2007) analysed the disbursement of microcredit by SRSP to women through women community organisations and found that the major effect in terms of gender-related economic activities related to the contribution of women to total household income. The study also found that there was insufficient credit and a lack of marketing facilities in the study area, and that credit was mostly utilised for livestock and enterprise development, which had not led to a statistically significant increase in the monthly income of the sample respondents.

Almost 6 percent of the population in conflict-affected areas of KP reported receiving free health care during the previous year (WFP, 2010). Coverage was highest in Malakand division (up to 10 percent of the population). Two findings are particularly worrying, however. First, less than 5 percent of households in FATA have received any such support, although this region has been observed to suffer from the highest morbidity rates among women and children, and access to quality health services has deteriorated here the most. Second, female-headed households are underrepresented among beneficiary households; only 2 percent have received free health care, compared with 6 percent of male-headed households.

Moreover, despite the encouraging rhetoric around social safety nets and the expansion of social protection in Pakistan (see Gazdar, 2011; Grosh et al., 2011), actual expenditure remains low, certainly in relation to GDP. This is perhaps unsurprising. Recent years have seen significant increases in security-related public expenditure (e.g. on public order and safety affairs), from 15 percent in 2001/02 to 24 percent in 2010/11 (SDPC, 2010), suggesting a diversion of state funds away from social (and other) sectors and towards security and defence – sectors which, broadly speaking, offer little in the way of dividends to ordinary citizens and whose expansion is actually associated with negative short-term effects on economic growth (Dunne, 2011). Interestingly, this has not translated into physical reductions in health and education expenditure – indeed, as Figure 3 shows, spending in these sectors has actually increased as a proportion of total government spending over the past decade – but it does imply that, from a financial perspective, security has dominated the government’s agenda.

Figure 3: Relative increases in public expenditure for key sectors (percent)

So, expenditure and coverage is one issue. But another is the effectiveness of the assistance received. A number of studies suggest that the effects of aid – whether state or non-state – are marginal to people’s livelihood trajectories and household recovery (Kurosaki and Khan, 2011; Kurosaki et al., 2012; Neuman et al., 2011; A. Shah, 2010). This indicates two things. First, that assistance is either inadequate to meet needs or is of an inappropriate nature. And second, that the actions and behaviour of people and communities themselves constitute the most important driver of recovery (see also section 5.1). This suggests that aid agencies and authorities should recognise the conditions under
which ‘autonomous recovery’ takes places and identify programmes and forms of support that can build on and strengthen the agency of individuals, households and villages.
5 Analysing responses to the crises

The sheer size of the crisis-affected area, the enormous number of victims and the short time within which aid was required have all created almost insurmountable challenges. Delivering aid to the affected needs infrastructure, but many roads are inaccessible because of the ongoing war between the Pakistani Army and Therik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or were inundated and damaged during the floods of 2010. In fact, many areas have become inaccessible just because of traditional means of transportation. Despite the obstacles, there has been a wide range of responses to the conflict and flood crises, and a brief analysis of these responses provides a foundation for considering further research and assessments of the connections between governance, aid, services and livelihoods.

5.1 Spontaneous help and local coping mechanisms

The most crucial device during the initial time of the crisis and conflicts was ‘local self-help’ – people’s own efforts to help and save their kin and their belongings, but also in starting the repair of access roads or local bridges (especially after the floods in the Swat Valley). These local safety nets and their stratifying consequences in the social field are almost unknown beyond the local level.

Within Pakistan, individual philanthropists, professional bodies, chambers of commerce and industries, as well as the corporate sector, have donated money and provided relief goods to people affected by conflict and difficult conditions (IUCN, 2010; PCP, 2009). In at least three recent incidents – the earthquake of 2005, the IDP crisis of 2009 and the floods of 2010 – these groups showed solidarity to those affected. This solidarity within Pakistan has gone almost unnoticed in international circles (PCP, 2009; SPO, 2011). These groups have taken truckloads of relief items and distributed them among survivors; collection sites for donations in kind as well as cash have been established by various governmental as well as non-governmental organisations. The Pakistani media has also played a positive role in terms of fund collection. There are about 50 independent TV channels in Pakistan and many of them ran special earthquake/IDP/flood transmissions on which various celebrities made appeals for donations and collected funds. The funds collected were handed over to various

5.2 The state

In principle, Pakistan does have an agency in place at the federal level to cope with disasters – the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), housed in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, with provincial branches. However, the legal status of this agency is in the doldrums as a result of delays in procedural matters. The National Disaster Management Ordinance 2006, under which the NDMA was constituted, is a Presidential Order that needs to be vetted by the Parliament within 120 days; this period lapsed several months back. Re-promulgation of the lapsed Ordinance is also not possible any longer, as the Constitution of Pakistan prevents the government from re-promulgating an ordinance more than once, since the recent 18th Amendment.

The NDMA was established as the focal point for coordinating and facilitating the implementation of strategies and programmes on disaster risk reduction, response and recovery. Similarly, disaster management authorities are to be established at provincial, district and municipal levels, with the NDMA to provide technical guidance to national and provincial stakeholders about formulation of plans, strategies and programmes. The NDMA is also to work towards capacity development of national, provincial and local stakeholders in collaboration with provincial and district agencies. As the government states:

This section draw on Geiser and Suleri (2010).
The National Disaster Risk Management Framework has been formulated to guide the work of entire system in the area of disaster risk management, through wide consultation with stakeholders from local, provincial and national levels. The Framework aims to ‘achieve sustainable social, economic and environmental development in Pakistan through reducing risks and vulnerabilities, particularly those of the poor and marginalized groups, and by effectively responding to and recovering from disaster impact’ (Government of Pakistan, 2007: xii).

Nine priority areas are identified to establish and strengthen policies, institutions and capacities over the next five years: i) institutional and legal arrangements for disaster risk management; ii) hazard and vulnerability assessment; iii) training, education and awareness; iv) disaster risk management planning; v) community and local-level programming; vi) multi-hazard early warning systems; vii) mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into development; viii) emergency response systems; and ix) capacity development for post-disaster recovery.

Reviews of the work of the different government agencies responding to the conflict and flood displacement found a lack of coordination between the provincial and federal agencies (Geiser and Suleri, 2011; White, 2011). The NDMA and its provincial counterparts have overlapping tasks and no well-defined boundaries and demarcation as to who has authority over what. This creates confusion in the administration of relief efforts. The tussle between the provincial and federal authorities is further evident in the lack of trust the provinces have of the federal ministry: they demand that resources are given directly to them instead of being channelled through the federal authorities. Interestingly, however, the provinces lack the resources and expertise to respond to disasters and have to look to the federal government and the military for support (Dorosh et al., 2010).

There is a public perception that the government suffers from corruption and lack of accountability, and lacks transparency in the management of funds. People also believe the country’s political leaders and members of Parliament exhibit extreme policy short-sightedness.

Inconsistency in the government’s policy and implementation creates confusion and reduces confidence. Although the NDMA was constitutionally mandated to take charge of all disaster efforts in late 2010, the prime minister, dissatisfied with the agency’s performance, proposed establishing another parallel agency, the National Disaster Management Committee. Prior to the NDMA, the Federal Flood Commission tackled floods, but, surprisingly, this was not given any authority after the 2010 floods (Dorosh et al., 2010; Government of NWFP, 2009).

An important question to be discussed at the national level in terms of being prepared for, and capable of handling, emergencies such as the IDP and flood crises, is whether existing organisational arrangements need to be replaced (or supplemented) by new ones – as envisaged in early August 2010 by the suggestion to establish a National Oversight Disaster Management Committee as a body separate from the NDMA. Would such new arrangements facilitate a quick, transparent, effective and target-oriented emergency response, or can existing arrangements function, at least in principle? If not, what are the actual reasons for difficulties? The best-organised and resourced player in Pakistan is the Army, and it is no surprise that this body plays a crucial role in delivering emergency aid, for example by helicopter, army boat, etc.

A crucial challenge is the often weak capacity of the decentralised local administration, which became even weaker after the tenure of local governments came to an end in 2009/10: a (new) system of local government was introduced in 2001, giving union councils and districts more power, including (at least to some extent) financial power, in development affairs. Currently, administrators from the state bureaucracy are running the local administrations and there is hardly any room for local people’s say in aid delivery and aid coordination.

5.3 Civil society

Understanding the contextual nature and historic formation of Pakistani civil society and individual civil society organisations (CSOs) is central to engaging them in essential service delivery. The differences between an idealised civil society and actual civil society in Pakistan shape community-based approaches to post-conflict recovery and service delivery. Thus, the nature of Pakistani civil society is as diverse as the cultures and causes from which armed conflict arises, as well as the variety of civic
responses. Civil society has local meaning beyond the activities of internationally recognised and supported CSOs.

Therefore, many of the views and values of society as a whole are mirrored by CSOs. The same holds true for the structure and function of CSOs, which reflect their own social origins, not an abstract ‘concept of civil society’. In different communities, CSOs will vary according to their origins, mission, social base and constituency. Their organisational goals may range from emergency relief to microfinance to reforestation. CSOs include NGOs, but also groups linked to political parties and professional associations (Geiser, 2006). Civil society also encompasses groups and charities that take their inspiration from religious ideas.

Village-level organisations used to be in place in Pakistan but are no longer intact, having been affected badly by the devolution process and also by militants (COMSATS 2009). Though still comparatively weak in Pakistan in relation to other South Asian countries, there are organisations at local, regional and national level that have links to the grassroots. The assortment of CSOs participating in Swat’s post-conflict processes reflects the broad nature of civil society. Most NGOs were active in Malakand division during the flood, IDP and earthquake crises.

The challenge comes in finding an effective means of delivering services to mitigate immediate needs in the absence of adequate government provision, while at the same time rebuilding long-term capacity within government institutions that are accountable. Decentralisation is often considered particularly important in post-conflict situations, as the necessary basic services are inherently local in their delivery. In practice, both governments and donors have learned there are significant obstacles in moving from centralised to decentralised systems, especially in the area of social services. At the same time, the move to greater decentralisation opens up space for more civil society involvement in both service delivery and policymaking at the local level, but this requires an enabling environment for CSOs.

While a number of international NGOs are working in the region, they rarely reach into more remote rural areas, partly because of security issues; they may try to provide seeds for agriculture or livestock for households, but frequently are not very successful because of limitations with regard to travel, local contacts and timing. It has been suggested that, if these organisations worked more closely with local organisations, they would be better able to identify and respond to the highest priorities of poor people. Furthermore, local organisations may have different perceptions and experiences with regard to determining security risks than international NGOs. Another problem is that people do not really trust NGOs as they think they have Western agendas, and doubt their credibility.

For NGOs (both local and international), the relatively slow distribution of donations and aid means they feel as if they have to compete and scramble for resources, equipment and manpower. Local NGOs are generally more constrained financially, and with international funding being channelled through international organisations, they felt more financially marginalised. Because they are not equipped to deal with donor administrative procedures, they are frequently unable to secure funding. At other times, the lack of swift financial transfers and cumbersome disbursement procedures hamper their ability to operate efficiently (Polastro et al., 2011).

A factor limiting the effectiveness of local NGOs is the lack of ‘home-grown experts in the areas of humanitarian relief, information management, geographical information systems and more generally, non-profit management’ (A.A. Malik, 2011: 5). The scarcity of such experts means that international NGOs, with their higher financial resources, are able to outbid local NGOs in their attempt to hire the most efficient officers. Local NGOs have to make do with inexperienced and untrained officials, which has an adverse effect on performance (ibid.)

In short, local NGOs that operate at the grassroots level have the advantage of being familiar with socioeconomic conditions and governance procedures but lack the financial resources to fully capitalise on their capabilities. On the other hand, international NGOs have the financial resources and the high-skilled experts and staff but lack crucial knowledge and access to the dispersed and most adversely affected communities.
Faith-based organisations are very quickly associated by some outside observers with fundamentalism or even the Taliban movement. There were widespread reports (broadcast on television around the globe) that emergency relief in Malakand division during the floods was being infiltrated by ‘fundamentalists’ providing relief for purely strategic reasons; the most cited example was of Falah-i-Insaniat.\(^9\) However, very little is known that would allow a sensitive differentiation between charitable movements that take their orientation and justification from religious arguments, and those that focus primarily on the spread of fundamentalism. Indeed, this is a highly under-researched subject, not only in Pakistan but also in other countries. How far do these organisations provide altruistic relief in times of disaster, and how far are these efforts solely strategic? The evidence is lacking at this point, which makes room, for example, for speculation that the government’s recent blaming of ‘Islamic organisations’ is intended to play well with the US government.\(^10\)

It is apparent that civil society in its different manifestations has many vital roles in conflict and in fragile conditions. Still, there is a need for a more constructive critical reflection on the nature of civil society in Pakistan, its boundaries and its practices.

### 5.4 International assistance

In response to the crises, bilateral as well as multilateral international organisations have become very active in support of specific relief initiatives, and many donors with established programmes in Pakistan immediately addressed the needs of conflict-affected people (see Section 4.2). In many cases, these have worked through networks established in the course of their regular project work, but there are very few empirical insights available regarding the nature of these networks. Do they represent local interests? Are they accountable, and to whom (not only to the donor)? Are they effective?

International assistance has been brought into many different geographic areas in several phases of humanitarian and post-disaster work, including the immediate flood response, specific programmes in post-conflict response and longer-term reconstruction. This has meant the different levels of government in Pakistan have had to coordinate work with a wide range of donor agencies, as well as both humanitarian and reconstruction aid instruments. It has also meant that different types of funding have been distributed through government, as well as through international NGOs and local CSOs. While various UN coordination mechanisms exist, such as the cluster system, the external politics of the War on Terror, localised security concerns in service delivery and issues of trust and inter-agency coordination further muddle the situation in Pakistan.

The PCNA for KP and FATA (ADB et al., 2011) was undertaken during the 11-month period ending in September 2010, before the impact of the devastating floods could be assessed. Its goal was to produce a helpful, pragmatic, coherent and sequenced peace-building strategy for the government of Pakistan that delivers an agreed vision within 10 years. The government approved the following vision for the future of KP and FATA:

> There is an emerging peace, greater prosperity and tolerance in KP and FATA. A historic transformation is underway, where the voices of all people are being heard, the rule of law is deepening, and the State is increasingly accountable, providing equitable opportunities for better health, education and employment (ADB et al., 2011: 5).

The fairly immediate and prompt response of international donors has not been sustained, which is often the problem with the ‘humanitarian’ and ‘development’ divide within aid agencies. Within weeks of the flood, hundreds of millions of dollars were provided to programmes in Pakistan, considerably easing the financial constraints on aid providers. Nevertheless, international organisations faced major logistical and administrative challenges in the field. More seriously, after the first wave of foreign commitments, the amount and consistency of subsequent support diminished. Far less aid was received than was pledged. This means resources had to be spread out, while cumbersome donor

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\(^9\) Falah-i-Insaniat is considered to be the new name for Jamaatud Dawa, the humanitarian arm of the banned organisation Laskar-e-Taiba.

disbursement procedures further delayed the delivery of funds to people in immediate need, as well as rehabilitation efforts.

These limitations have considerably affected the performance of international agencies. Another factor that has diminished the performance of UN agencies and international NGOs relates to the generation of assessment reports. These help organisations determine the needs and requirements of communities in the wake of a disaster, and many such reports were produced for Pakistan. However, many agencies have carried out their own individual assessment reports, to cater best to their own individual operations and donor ‘market’. This has meant other agencies have not been able to take full advantage of these reports, and lack of linkages and coordination between the reports has exacerbated the problem. A few joint assessments have been carried out, but these have been criticised for taking too long: long enough for the situation on the ground to change, rendering the reports less valuable. Furthermore, the different formats of the reports have made information consolidation and sharing even more difficult (Polastro et al., 2011).

A criticism of the international response by communities is that assistance has been ‘supply based’ and not ‘need based’. ‘We were affected by the floods but we were not asked what our needs were. Some groups visited but they meet with the feudal landowners only’ (in Polastro et al., 2011: 30). This again highlights the importance of effective need-based assessments that are not only easily accessible but also widely understandable and applicable.

5.5 The challenge of governance

Coordinating the delivery of aid to conflict- and crisis-affected areas; having plans ready beforehand (being prepared); bringing all stakeholders on board; ensuring the proper operation and maintenance of public infrastructure; creating but also operating and maintaining organisations for disaster preparedness – all these are facets of governance. While ‘government’ refers to planning and decision-making by the state and its institutions, the notion of ‘governance’ takes a societal view. How are decisions made within a certain society or nation? Who is involved in these processes and who has which powers to decide? On which evidence is planning based and which planning documents are taken as a basis for decision-making? How are conflicting views dealt with? To use the definition offered by Torfing:

Governance can be defined as the complex process through which a plurality of societal actors aims to formulate and achieve common objectives by mobilizing and deploying a diversity of ideas, rules, and resources. This definition emphasizes three distinctive features of governance. First, governance designates a process rather than a set of more or less formal institutions. Second, the process is driven by a collective ambition to define and pursue common objectives in the face of divergent interests. Third, the process is de-centred in the sense that common objectives are formulated and achieved through the interaction of a plurality of actors from the state, the economy, and civil society (Torfing, 2010: 564).

While Pakistan has structures and systems that give evidence of a democracy (or a democracy in the making), the challenge lies in assessing how current and emergent institutions function in practice. The state of Pakistan is structured along this ambition, manifested for example through its multiparty system, the holding of multiparty elections where opposition parties have competitive opportunities to take office, an independent judiciary and the devolution of power (decentralisation) along principles of subsidiarity.

The crises in conflict-affected areas of Pakistan, as well as the impact of the floods, present a severe challenge to the government of Pakistan, and to the manifestations of governance processes. For example, various reports highlight the miseries of the people of Swat, Buner and Malakand, with an accompanying criticism of all levels of government and government agencies. National as well as international media continuously report on the absence of ‘the government’ in many conflict-affected areas, and even on the failure of the state; at the federal level, conflicts between various sections of the administration seem to affect the government’s ability to act. But above all, the catastrophe challenges the whole governance process (as defined above) as it exists in the country. Indeed, the media are full of reports that raise questions on the governance of the disaster.
Members of the KP Assembly blamed both government officials and NGOs for mismanaging relief operations, while politicians are insulted in the media (Dawn International, 2010). Members of the Assembly asked why the prime minister stated that 80 percent of aid would go through NGOs, questioning whether this was in effect a confession about the failure of government, and a call for new governance (Suleri, 2010b).

One of the many dimensions of this governance crisis is the highly contested nature of local government and related decentralisation processes. It is possible to hypothesise that effective local administrative structures and processes can be an asset in handling not only the emergency phase of a catastrophe such as the IDP crisis or floods, but also reconstruction. In this regard, though, Pakistan has a very convoluted history when it comes to local government and governance relations. All efforts at decentralisation took place under military rule, and all were abandoned (or severely ‘modified’) once democratic governments came into power. Indeed, there is enormous scepticism even among academia of local government, precisely because it is linked to martial law. Besides this, very little is known on the everyday performance of local governments. There are a few evaluations by donors, and there is very little independent research. However, although decentralisation in Pakistan has occurred mainly under military leadership, this does not negate the importance of a closer examination. Research can explore what can be learned from these efforts regarding the ‘practice of citizenship’ on the ground, what Afifa S. Zia and Akbar S. Zaidi call ‘working citizenship […] the meetings of local actors who attempted some mutual agreement at resolving conflict, implementing schemes and surviving or developing as a community’.

Yet there is another dilemma: the complex governance structure of FATA. Under the Constitution of Pakistan, FATA is included among the territories of Pakistan (Article 1). It is represented in the National Assembly and the Senate but remains under the direct executive authority of the president (Articles 51, 59 and 247). Laws framed by the National Assembly do not apply here unless so ordered by the president, who is also empowered to issue regulations for the ‘peace and good government’ of the tribal areas. Today, FATA continues to be governed primarily through the Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901. It is administered by the governor of KP in his capacity as an agent to the president of Pakistan, under the overall supervision of the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions in Islamabad (Government of NWFP, 2007). Each tribal agency in FATA is administered by a political agent, assisted by a number of assistant political agents, Tehsildars (administrative heads of tehsils) and Naib Tehsildars (deputy tehsildars), as well as members of various local police forces (khasadars) and security forces (levies, scouts). As part of their administrative functions, political agents oversee the working of line departments and service providers, playing a supervisory role for development projects and chairing an agency development sub-committee comprising various government officials, to recommend proposals and approve development projects. They also serve as project coordinators for rural development schemes. State interference in local matters is kept at a minimum. Likewise, areas in Malakand have a distinct historical background, including governance structure. For example, Swat remained independent or at least semi-independent for most of its known history till 1969 (Sultan-i-Rome, 2009); even after becoming part of Pakistan, local people often challenged the state’s legitimacy (Geiser, 2000; Shahbaz, 2009).

In this challenging context, it is apparent that Pakistan is passing through one of the difficult times of its recent history. Governance challenges are complex and diverse in nature. As mentioned in Section 1, in the quest to attain national, regional and global securities individual security has been overlooked in Pakistan; socio-political instability leading to violence and militarisation threatens not only national but also regional (and at times global) security too. The fundamental responsibility of a state is to protect the security and promote the welfare/livelihoods of its citizens (Thakur and Newman, 2004), but this report’s evidence suggests the capacity of the state of Pakistan to fulfil this task in conflict-affected situation is rather limited.

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Among the key determinants of how decentralisation and service delivery are linked to post-conflict settlements are how these processes are related to processes of state-building, including:

- The historic background and subsequent evolution of the political settlements in KP as they relate to the nature of the conflict;
- How different factors have shaped political arrangements over time, and what aspects of the settlement affect decentralisation processes, livelihoods, markets and service delivery;
- The evolution of state–society relations and processes by which central government seeks to establish or strengthen its legitimacy in a post-conflict setting, how decentralisation and support for livelihoods, markets and services address the concerns and conflicts among different groups and what factors guide the design and implementation of decentralised authorities and services;
- The ‘rules of the game’ and the degree to which formal rules are institutionalised and interact with informal rules and power structures, such as the implicit roles of line ministries, the participation or exclusion of specific groups and social cohesion at the local level.

5.6 Beyond the ‘blame game’

Much of the critique on the inefficiency of the government and of the governance system is known. However, questionable aspects of these criticisms mean it is important to approach them with care – and this again has to do with evidence. Pakistan is a highly politicised country, which on the one hand means it generates vibrant debates. On the other hand, in a system with a ‘ruling party’ versus an ‘opposition party’ (both with allied parties), the blame attributed to the government needs to be assessed carefully. Is it, as Pakistan’s High Commissioner to London states, that ‘there are some subversive elements that are hell-bent to run down the democratic government and are busy in casting aspersions on even good intentioned initiatives to make them look with suspicion’ (Hasan, 2010). On which criteria and with what evidence, and on what scale, do we blame a government for being inefficient, or efficient for that matter?

The government can indeed be criticised (even blamed) for inefficiencies, but the real challenge ahead is to take insights from existing research and surveys as starting points, and to develop, propose and discuss feasible alternatives that help ensure an effective governance system (including decentralisation) suitable for the conditions of Pakistan in general and the conflict situation in particular. Even the prime minister of Pakistan had to publically ask those who were talking of a change in government to come up with a ‘substitute’ that might work in this country.14

The media in Pakistan are full these days of demands at a very general level, for example that ‘the government should deliver’, etc. But how should the government and the governance system operate – taking into account the experiences of the past? Is all of what the government does to be blamed, or are there instances where it has been able to deliver? And why was it able to deliver in these instances? What were the ingredients that allowed for effectiveness? There is an enormous role not only for the media and its journalists but also for researchers in the country to investigate such issues.

6 Data, quality, methods and gaps

The quality of data available from various donor, government and non-government organisations is questionable, particularly given the uneven coverage of the surveys available – often because of security concerns at the time of data collection (see Khan, 2009) – and the lack of a consistent methodology between agencies and surveys. This concern was also openly expressed in all stakeholder consultations conducted by SDPI. Stakeholders gave the example of how the literature discusses only the positive impact of the Pakistani Army in conflict areas, whereas there have been numerous reports of how branching the Army out in rehabilitation efforts will only thin out its effectiveness overall.

To an extent, the lack of good data is a result of simple timing and logistics. KP and FATA, and many other parts of Pakistan, have either experienced very recent crises or are continuing to experience them. Conducting robust research in such contexts is extremely challenging, and in many ways it is to be expected that, as KP’s recent MDG progress report states, ‘the impacts of the catastrophe are still being evaluated’ (Government of KP and UNDP 2011: v).

That said, some evidence does exist; we are not completely in the dark when it comes to understanding the impacts of violence and floods in KP and FATA. Household surveys – admittedly based on restrictive sample sizes and rarely fully representative – provide important insights into what has happened to ordinary Pakistanis living in afflicted areas (see HOPE 87, 2010; Khan, 2009; Save the Children, 2010). What is missing are longitudinal data that tell us more about broader livelihood patterns and trajectories than individual snapshots are able to. As Kurokaki et al. (2012: 2) argue, ‘Since the recovery process is dynamic in nature, a single “snapshot” survey after a disaster cannot provide detailed information on it’, and their study represents one of the only pieces of follow-up research identified by this review.

The relative paucity of gender-disaggregated data is also notable and of particular concern. This has much to do with problems associated with the actual data collection process rather than badly designed methodological approaches. Most of the data collection is carried out by male enumerators, and local customs and traditions in Malakand division prevent access to women in such instances. For example, because of ‘local cultural restrictions’, women comprised just four percent of the sample used for Khan’s (2009) rapid assessment report of Swat for Save the Children. Strikingly, this was despite active efforts by the research team to purposively identify and select women from the outset.

Most of the evaluations by international development agencies focus on assessing the outcomes of their own development interventions. Little attention has been devoted to adapting these development evaluations to contexts facing conflict. There is also a lack of a gendered understanding of the phenomenon of how terrorism affects different communities and regions in the country.

Donor agencies demand more uniformity and specialisation in research methods. Looking at the PCNA as an example, it seems this pays little attention to drivers of conflict, but a post-conflict assessment has little scope with regard to laying out the origins of the conflict; this may reflect how in some instances research can be narrowed because of donor requirements. The humanitarian imperative facing KP and FATA in recent years has clearly shaped the kind of knowledge and data that have been sought and collected, particularly by aid agencies. Resources have been focused on carrying out rapid assessments of the impacts of conflict and flooding in order to establish needs and priorities and identify appropriate responses. Given the severity of the disasters, this is perfectly understandable.

However, in order to better understand the truly complex impacts of the compound crises of conflict and flooding, more attention has to be given to carrying out research that has the depth and contextual analysis to contribute to an improved knowledge base – Aliman Shah’s (2010) qualitative exploration of household livelihood trajectories in Swat would be a good example of this. The government of Pakistan is more engaged with quantitative methods of research and data collection rather than detailed qualitative methods, so as to reduce the time required and increase the outreach of its programmes. Most household surveys on a large scale are in fact conducted by the government, and the reliability of
these data are questionable, as some areas of KP and Malakand are inaccessible by these mechanisms.

In terms of data availability and research reports, the following gaps are observed: impact assessments of interventions; studies on the role of informal institutions; empirical/scientific research on people’s response/coping strategies in conflicts and disasters; and gender-sensitive data in the context of conflict. Many of the interventions in the conflict-affected areas of KP and FATA are ongoing initiatives, but there is a notable lack of rigorous and scientific impact assessments of completed interventions. A good deal of literature exists on the livelihoods, food security and problems facing KP, but little scientific research is available in the context of post-conflict situations. There is also inadequate evidence on people’s own initiatives in terms of socioeconomic recovery or dealing with other impacts of the conflict.
7 Conclusion

Having been hit by multiple, compound crises over recent years, Pakistan in general, and KP and FATA in particular, continue to face a series of challenges in relation to supporting and rebuilding livelihoods, ensuring access to basic services and expanding social protection initiatives.

Food insecurity has emerged as one of the most serious threats in Pakistan’s post-conflict environment, with data from KP and FATA revealing that the first instance of poor livelihood security being realised is when food insecurity starts to strengthen its grip on society. In terms of local economic activity and markets, evidence suggests that the currently minor role of the private sector in contributing towards economic recovery is unlikely to increase until the security situation improves. Service delivery continues to be hampered by the destruction of infrastructure in Malakand and FATA.

We have also seen that, although there has been a relatively rapid response from international aid agencies, NGOs and the Pakistan state to the crises, there is a lack of evidence regarding both the amount of aid that actually reaches the most vulnerable and the effectiveness of programmes. Nonetheless, current evidence suggests that policies and programmes miss out on relating in full to the perspective of people in conflict-affected situations. To a certain extent, this is perhaps unsurprising: international aid agencies have reported many constraints, including security threats and hindrances related to government formalities while working in conflict- and flood-affected area of Malakand and FATA.

7.1 Lessons for policy and programming

International donors and government authorities have been inconsistent and uneven in how they have responded to and addressed the diversity of impacts of the conflict and flood displacements on livelihoods, services and markets. Despite reforms in the international humanitarian system, and greater attention to disaster management by the government of Pakistan, the current functioning of different institutions is inadequate in terms of contextual assessment, priority setting and implementation.

The current institutional landscape of development assistance hinders efforts to address the diversity of needs in a more integrated, effective manner. Foreign and external agencies still lack understanding of pre-existing conditions, the internal dynamics of different communities and the diverse and gendered responses of individuals, households and communities to conflict and floods.

There is an on-going risk that external definitions of security as purely an issue of insurgents ignore other important ways in which the conflict and the flood have affected women and men’s security. Purely security-driven responses have limited impacts related to other types of responses, particularly to support the interests and needs of women.

Donors need to give greater attention to both local livelihood factors and broader linkages with market and enabling factors in conflict and disaster situations. This requires an understanding of the pre-existing (inevitably unequal and problematic in some ways) conditions. Donors need to pay attention to the enabling environment that supports the rebuilding of destroyed markets, as well as of household livelihoods. This will depend on an assessment of the level of loss, who the affected are and the political economy of markets and market holders.

A greater understanding of local dynamics, pre- and post-conflict, can guide donors in terms of reinvigorating the private sector, targeting investments and providing essential financing for market support. In rebuilding households in KP and FATA, initiatives such as restocking of livestock, short-term cash transfers to reduce debt and maintain household consumption and provision of agricultural tools and seeds may all be required. Beyond the household, donors and government agencies need to attend to the rebuilding of physical infrastructure, the reopening of shops and wider factors in value or supply chains, such as transport, finance and fuel.
These programmes can be implemented by different local agencies, depending on the skills and capacity of the organisation involved. This may include cooperatives, local CSOs, local financial institutions, agencies of local government and partners of national and international NGOs. These agencies may seek to build on some elements of previous market and production systems, but also may, carefully, use opportunity for reforms and changes, while being realistic (i.e. forms of exclusion, power, property holding do not disappear because of conflict or disaster).

7.2 Areas for future research

The literature reviewed in this paper suggests there are several gaps in our understanding of livelihoods, services and social protection in Pakistan. In particular, there is a lack of quality empirical evidence on the following:

- The role of informal institutions and community-based organisations in supporting (or undermining) people's livelihoods
- People’s own coping strategies in crises and changes in activity over time
- Inclusion/exclusion of different social groups from access to basic services
- Impacts of aid- or government-funded social safety nets
- The role of international aid in state-building
- Gender in conflict-affected situations
Annex

Annex 1: Terms of reference

Evidence papers protocol

In our general and technical tender for the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) we raised concerns about the current state of literature on fragile states and on service delivery, social protection and livelihoods. We argued that the literature tended to provide generic overviews of issues (sometimes even literature reviews of other literature reviews) rather than more rigorous empirical and context-specific analysis. We identified four core weaknesses:

- A case study focus on small geographical pockets or individual sectors that led to a partial rather than comprehensive portrayal of people’s own lives and livelihoods in fragile and conflict-affected situations;
- A lack of comparable studies due to the use of different methods, definitions and contexts;
- A focus on snapshots or stock-takes of livelihoods, social protection and service delivery and a lack of longitudinal analysis that enables our understanding, particularly at household and community level, to be dynamic instead of static; and
- Research that is isolated from rather than integrated into economic analyses of growth and development

The production of evidence papers during the inception phase of our RPC provides an opportunity to us to test the extent and depth of these weaknesses and to begin to tackle the weaknesses. In the inception phase of the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) we will be producing 10 evidence papers (Figure 1):

1. Global synthesis of what we know about growth and livelihoods in fragile and conflict-affected situations
2. Global synthesis of what we know about basic services and social protection in fragile and conflict-affected situations
3. Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Nepal
4. Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Sri Lanka
5. Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Afghanistan
6. Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Pakistan
7. Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in DRC
8. Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in South Sudan
9. Synthesis of what we know about growth, livelihoods, basic services and social protection in Uganda
10. Gender paper

This paper describes our methodological protocol for the production of the evidence papers. It describes how we will capture elements of the systematic review methodology without carrying out a systematic review. A full systematic review would have limited usefulness given: the large number of questions that we have to answer; the lack of agreed terminology or complexity of many of the themes (and therefore search strings) that our research covers (‘fragile’, ‘social cohesion’, ‘basic services’, ‘livelihoods’, ‘growth’); and that recent reviews have demonstrated that only very small numbers of high quality research outputs are identified by systematic reviews.
However, our evidence papers will certainly benefit from adapting some of elements of the systematic review, especially because we will have a large team working on the papers, spread across different geographical locations and institutional homes. Benefits include:

- More careful development of research questions (rather than research themes or areas), including deconstruction of research questions in terms of population, intervention, comparator and outcome. This is particularly important given the very broad parameters of our research;
- Ensuring a consistent sampling and interpretation of literature;
- Reducing bias in our analysis of policies and programmes;
- Systematically assessing research quality and using this to identify gaps in research outputs based on quality rather than quantity of outputs; and
- The opportunity to establish a baseline for assessing the current state of research and replicating our process in 5-6 years’ time to assess our impact

**Research questions**

Our research questions have been developed in consultation with RPC partners and affiliates and with DFID. They are significantly more complex than typical systematic review questions.

For evidence papers 1 -2 (Growth and Livelihoods, Basic Services and Social Protection), authors will be required to answer the following questions:

- **People:** What is known about peoples’ own responses, disaggregated by gender, to conflict and their tactics for making a living and maintaining access to basic services and social protection?
- **Governance:** How do state and society interact in the institutional arrangements that mediate livelihoods, social protection and access to services? What are the gender dimensions of these interactions?
- **Aid:** What aid is being provided and its effectiveness in supporting access to basic services, livelihoods and social protection? What is known about the gendered impact of aid?
- **Private sector:** What is known about the role of the private sector in a) delivering services and social protection and b) stimulating multipliers and growth linkages?
- **Linkages:** What linkages between people-aid-governance determine outcomes in relation to livelihoods and access to social protection and basic services?
• **Data:** What current, gender-disaggregated data exists on poverty levels, livelihoods, growth, access to basic services, access to social protection and key health and nutrition indicators and what quality is it?

• **Quality:** What is the quality of the current evidence (including the extent to which gender is analysed)

• **Methods:** What methods are currently being used to research livelihoods, access to services and social protection

• **Gaps:** What gaps exist in the evidence, research methods and secondary data

For each of evidence papers 3 – 5 (Afghanistan / Pakistan, Sri Lanka / Nepal, Uganda / South Sudan / DRC), authors will be required to answer the same questions:

• **People:** What are peoples’ own responses, disaggregated by gender, to conflict and tactics for making a living and maintaining access to basic services?

• **Governance:** How do state and society interact in the institutional arrangements that mediate livelihoods, social protection and access to services? What are the gender dimensions of these interactions?

• **Aid:** What aid is being provided and its effectiveness in supporting access to basic services, livelihoods and social protection? What is known about the gendered impacts of aid?

• **Linkages:** What linkages between people-aid-governance determine outcomes in relation to livelihoods and access to social protection and basic services?

• **Private sector:** What is known about the role of the private sector in a) delivering services and social protection and b) stimulating multipliers and growth linkages?

• **Data:** What current, gender-disaggregated data exists on poverty levels, livelihoods, growth, access to basic services, access to social protection and key health and nutrition indicators and what quality is it?

• **Quality:** What is the quality of the current evidence (including the extent to which gender is analysed)

• **Methods:** The types of methods currently being used to research livelihoods, access to services and social protection

• **Gaps:** What gaps exist in the evidence, research methods and secondary data

For such a large research programme with multiple outputs, it is difficult to pin down the parameters of research questions as would be the case in a systematic review: there will be no single definition of population, intervention, comparator and outcome that makes sense across all questions and countries. Guidelines and regular consultation will be used to ensure that across the team, there is some consistency in setting parameters.

**Searching and recording strategy**

All of the evidence papers will be based on a thorough and systematic literature search. A broad range of relevant academic databases will be searched (see Appendix 1 for an initial list). The London-based team will coordinate the search so that there is no replication of effort across the different teams responsible for papers 1 – 5. For each evidence paper the team will list of databases/ sources to be used and the search terms that will be applied. Criteria will be developed for how to decide on the relevance of sources. The list of databases and sources, search terms and criteria will be shared between the different evidence paper teams to ensure a consistent and replicable approach. The London-based team (evidence papers 1 and 2) will lead on the identification of formal published literature, particularly that found in open and closed access journals. The country-based teams (evidence papers 3–5) will focus on grey literature specific to their respective countries. All teams will regularly share other literature that their searches uncover.
A database system (possibly EPPI Reviewer 4 – to be confirmed) will be used to manage and code studies found during the review.

The following will therefore be developed jointly by the research assistants / evidence paper leaders and research directors over the next month:

- A list of databases and sources to be used
- Agreed search terms to be applied and definitions for terms
- Criteria for deciding on the relevance of articles and other literature to be included in the analysis
- An agreed matrix for analysing and classifying the results of these searches

All studies will record the search process and the criteria by which literature is included or excluded (what search terms are used, where results are found, why literature was excluded etc) in a way that will enable the studies to be replicated in 2015 and ensure that the analysis is transparent and objective.

Evidence papers 3–5 will also require a review of the grey literature including policy documents, evaluations and other unpublished documents. This should be gathered in-country and globally by consulting with key stakeholders (donors, aid agencies, government etc) in an iterative process with the stakeholder consultation.

The review will cover both content (what are the key issues raised in the literature) and make judgements about the quality of the evidence and methods used.

Analysis

The results from these searches will be systematically analysed using an agreed matrix for classifying results. This will be developed by the London teams for the global syntheses and shared and adapted by the teams working evidence papers 3–5.

The analysis process for the global syntheses will be agreed in week commencing Monday 2nd May. It is anticipated that either

1. Specific sectors will be allocated to the four team members (RS, RM and 2 x research assistants) and each researcher will iteratively build an analysis of that sector with sectoral inputs from sector specialist; or
2. Research themes (especially people-aid-governance) will be divided between the researchers and they will iteratively build an analysis of that theme with inputs for sector leads; or
3. Based on this division of labour the teams will produce a shared analysis of quality and methods. The team for papers 1–2 will produce weekly reports on progress and findings and meet weekly to share results of analysis. These reports will be shared with those working on other evidence papers.

The process (for the global synthesis) will be shared with teams working on evidence papers 3–5 who will adapt it to fit the specific context for their work. It is anticipated that evidence Papers 3–5 will follow the shared outline to maximise comparative findings. A draft outline is proposed below which will be revised based on comments now and discussion with the research teams once the reviews are underway. A decision will need to be made about whether each evidence paper has two-three separate chapters for each countries, or whether each sections includes all (2 or 3) countries.
Box 3: Draft outline for country evidence papers

Introduction – 1 page

Country Contexts – 3 pages

A section outlining the basic social, economic and political context of the two – three countries in question. It should include core indicators such as the percentage of people with access to clean water etc from sources such as the Human Development Index.

Livelihoods and growth – 15 pages

Basic services and social protection – 15 pages

Each of these sections should be broken down into sub-sections on:

**People:** What are peoples’ own responses, disaggregated by gender, to conflict and tactics for making a living and maintaining access to basic services?

**Governance:** How do state and society interact in the institutional arrangements that mediate livelihoods, social protection and access to services? What are the gender dimensions of these interactions?

**Aid:** What aid is being provided and its effectiveness in supporting access to basic services, livelihoods and social protection? What is known about the gendered impacts of aid?

**Linkages:** What linkages between people-aid-governance determine outcomes in relation to livelihoods and access to social protection and basic services?

**Private sector:** What is known about the role of the private sector in a) delivering services and social protection and b) stimulating multipliers and growth linkages?

**Data:** What current, gender-disaggregated data exists on poverty levels, livelihoods, growth, access to basic services, access to social protection and key health and nutrition indicators and what quality is it?

**Quality:** What is the quality of the current evidence (including the extent to which gender is analysed)

**Methods:** The types of methods currently being used to research livelihoods, access to services and social protection

**Gaps:** What gaps exist in the evidence, research methods and secondary data

Conclusions – 6 pages
## Annex 2: What’s being done in Malakand division? Overview of projects and interventions

This table lists the projects being carried out in Malakand division as indicated by PaRRSA, KP, on its website.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project title</th>
<th>Funding source</th>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Cost (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To contribute to reducing the mortality and morbidity of the displaced population and the strained host population in NWFP through the re-establishment of access to primary health care units (BHUs and RHC units) in the district of Swabi and Buner.</td>
<td>Private funds ECHO funds Dutch funds</td>
<td>Médecins du Monde</td>
<td>To contribute to reducing the mortality and morbidity of the displaced population and the strained host population in NWFP through the re-establishment of access to primary health care units (BHUs and RHC units) in the district of Swabi and Buner.</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Provision of repair services to PHED-registered damaged water supply schemes and hygiene promotional support to Buner returnees.</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>ActionAid Pakistan</td>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>340,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Non-food items distribution in Mardan and Malakand districts.</td>
<td>IDCA, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>International SOS (humanitarian aid organisation)</td>
<td>NFIs</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Emergency Response Project for IDPs of Swat, NWFP, located in Hazara division.</td>
<td>Trocaire (Ireland)</td>
<td>Rural Development Project</td>
<td>Fls, NFIs, Social protection, Health/hygiene</td>
<td>187,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Swat</td>
<td>ADF partner organisations</td>
<td>Anatolian Development Foundation</td>
<td>Fls, NFIs, Winter protection, Shelter, Reconstruction</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. (1) Primary health care services in Nan Saar Buner (2) primary health services in Toru Warsak Buner (3) WFP Food Assistance Programme for non-IDPs in Swat, Shangla, Dir, Buner (4) livelihoods (seed distribution) (5) livelihoods (rehabilitation of offices).</td>
<td>WHO, WFP HHRD US</td>
<td>Helping Hand for Relief &amp; Development</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>317,615.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. (1) ARC Pakistan’s emergency Response and Recovery Programme (2) restoring essential WASH services and providing means of livelihood for the returnee population of Swat.</td>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>American Refugee Committee</td>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>2,027,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Food Aid for Returning IDPs in Buner and Swat.</td>
<td>CRWRC</td>
<td>Interfaith League Against Poverty</td>
<td>Food aid</td>
<td>911,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Support for the rehabilitation of displaced families returning home (Swat and Buner).</td>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Inter-cooperation</td>
<td>Agriculture, Livestock</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project title</td>
<td>Funding source</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Cost (US$)</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Early Recovery Support for internally displaced and returnee population in Buner.</td>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td>World Vision Pakistan</td>
<td>Food aid, Shelter, Child protection, Health</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Strengthen the community-based care system to protect children from effects of armed conflict in Swat, Buner, Lower Dir, Mardan.</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Hayat Foundation</td>
<td>Protection, Education</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Malakand Integrated Early Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme: rehabilitation of education system/infrastructure, livelihoods recovery through small-scale support to enterprise development, agricultural support, water supply and sanitation, etc.</td>
<td>Qatar Charity</td>
<td>Qatar Charity</td>
<td>Livelihoods, Education, WASH, Social protection, Health</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Increased access to psychosocial support for vulnerable children and improved community awareness on issues related to child wellbeing in Buner</td>
<td>Not given</td>
<td>World Vision Pakistan</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Water supply, sanitation and hygiene education for 4 UCs of Swat</td>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>Pak Community Development Programme</td>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>322,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Provision of curative and preventive health services to conflict-affected people in selected UCs of Swat</td>
<td>CARE International Pakistan</td>
<td>IDEA</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>136,055.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. School improvement programme for Buner</td>
<td>Plan Pakistan</td>
<td>Children's Global Network</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>136,055.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Early Recovery of Livelihoods in Conflict-affected Areas of Buner</td>
<td>Trocaire (Ireland)</td>
<td>Rural Development Project</td>
<td>Agriculture, Social protection</td>
<td>296,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Buner Early Recovery Programme</td>
<td>Partner Aid International, Concern Worldwide – RAPID FUND</td>
<td>Partner Aid International</td>
<td>Agriculture, Social protection</td>
<td>409,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project title</td>
<td>Funding source</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Sector</td>
<td>Cost (US$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Community services in Swat</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Youth Resource Centre</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>45,142.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Girls Back to Schools in Dir Upper and Lower</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Khwendo Kor</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>14,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Community rehabilitation/ revitalisation through food and shelter provision for vulnerable communities in selected locations in Swat</td>
<td>WFP, UNHCR, UN-Habitat</td>
<td>Community Motivation and Development Organisation</td>
<td>Shelter/Early recovery</td>
<td>47,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Provision of transitional shelter to 100 families in Matta and Babuzai tehsils of Swat</td>
<td>UNHCR, UN-Habitat</td>
<td>Initiative to Base Development on Rights and Knowledge</td>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>33,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Establishment of community health centre in Swat</td>
<td>HDFNA</td>
<td>Human Development Foundation</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>41,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Early Recovery Programme, Swat</td>
<td>DFID, OFDA AusAID</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services Pakistan</td>
<td>Livelihoods/WASH/Education</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. CRISP Swat School Reconstruction/Mingora</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Community Rehabilitation and Infrastructure Support Project</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Promotion of primary health care in Swat</td>
<td>CARE International Pakistan</td>
<td>Dosti Development Foundation</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>158,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Comprehensive health care project for Buner (preventive, promotive and curative health care)</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>Centre of Excellence and Rural Development</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>28,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Malakand Strategy below (prepared by the government of KP) outlines interventions in different sector as follows; the strategy separates interventions into short-term interventions and intermediate/long-term interventions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention sector</th>
<th>Short term</th>
<th>Intermediate/long term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roads and bridges</td>
<td>The most costly aspect of infrastructure restoration work will be to restore roads and bridges to the pre-violence state.</td>
<td>Investments will be made in new projects that expand the road network and improve access within and to the region, such as the expressway from Rashakai Interchange to Mingora and a dual carriageway further to Kalam with a tunnel in the Malakand mountain range. There is a need to dedicate a much higher proportion of resources than in the past to maintain the existing road network. Obviously, this will delay costly capital improvements and enable the people to enjoy full benefits of the road network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power system</td>
<td>Restoration of power services is essential to the functioning of normal social and economic activities in the region.</td>
<td>For the intermediate and long term, the government of NWFP needs to promote private investment in hydel electric power plants in the division and to negotiate attractive terms with investors. This will ensure an important natural resource of the region will be harnessed to ensure improved electricity supply and contribute to government revenue. Special attention will also have to be paid to meet the power demand before hydel plants can be commissioned, which in many cases takes more than five to seven years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation system/agriculture</td>
<td>Agriculture, including horticulture, is the single largest source of employment in the area. 70% of the value of production is crops, fruits and vegetables, with a significant part exported outside the region. The area has been rich in livestock, being home to the largest population of sheep and goats, again much of which was destined for export.</td>
<td>Current spending on maintenance of the irrigation system is about a quarter of what is required and there is an even higher priority in maintaining and rehabilitating existing schemes to increase water efficiency, in view of the constraints on overall water supply. Water efficiency programmes will include small-scale schemes, water conservation and regulation of groundwater. In view of the increasing variability of rainfall and reduction in natural mountain water storage that is likely to arise from climate change, a significant sum will be committed to flood protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural growth</td>
<td>Agricultural growth is constrained by fragile natural resources, fragmentation of landholdings, underfunded research and extension and limited availability of financial services, all of which contribute to low levels of productivity. Resumption of agricultural production as soon as is practicable will assure the farmer and his family their food supply after the next harvest season, protect the area from the prospect of increasingly expensive food imports in a volatile world food market, as experienced in the recent years, and provide an opportunity to earn income from exports.</td>
<td>In the intermediate and long run, improved access to technology, investment in land levelling and development and water harvesting are needed to ensure efficiency and productivity in agriculture, in particular horticulture, cut flowers, cane fruits and livestock productivity. Reforms are also needed to simplify the administrative procedures and make the business environment friendly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoration of mining activity</td>
<td>Mining is an important driver of economic activity in the Malakand region. Mining facilities have suffered major physical damage. An immediate priority of the recovery programme is to repair this damage so this important source of livelihood for thousands of people is restored.</td>
<td>A longer-term priority is the development of new mining ventures, preferably in the private sector, with appropriate inputs and incentives from the public sector.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following is a list of projects being carried out USAID Pakistan in Malakand division. All the projects are being implemented with support from PaRRSA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Funding</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Scope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quick impact</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Transition Initiative</td>
<td>$8.51 million</td>
<td>September 2008–July 2010</td>
<td>USAID, through PTI, has implemented 211 short-term, quick impact projects in Malakand including repair/upgrade of 37 government buildings, rehabilitation of more than 55 schools and creation of over 150,000 employment days for local labour spanning construction of flood protection walls, irrigation channels, water pumps and generators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic growth</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microenterprise Revitalization Program</td>
<td>$1.8 million</td>
<td>June 2010–December 2010</td>
<td>USAID will contribute to responding to the urgent need for livelihood recovery and rehabilitation in post-conflict areas through the provision of micro-grants to 7,000 poor families in Swat most affected by the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprenticeship and Skills Training Program</td>
<td>$2.1 million</td>
<td>June 2010–December 2010</td>
<td>USAID will provide pre-employment and on-the-job skills training in construction and agriculture to secure employment for 1,700 vulnerable youth and ensure that local firms engaged in reconstruction find employees with the necessary skill sets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matching Grants for Business Revitalization Program</td>
<td>$9.0 million</td>
<td>June 2010–December 2010</td>
<td>USAID will revitalise Swat’s economy in tourism, horticulture, weaving, marble, food processing, transport and other key sectors by providing grants to 1,100 small and medium enterprises whose businesses were damaged by the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Initiative for Mothers and Newborns</td>
<td>$11.9 million</td>
<td>October 2004–September 2010</td>
<td>USAID has renovated/equipped 11 health facilities; trained health care providers to provide round-the-clock mother and newborn health support; and provided 9 ambulances to rush expecting mothers to the nearest health facility during emergencies in the districts of Upper Dir, Buner and Swat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Polio Eradication Initiative</td>
<td>$3.5 million/year</td>
<td>2003–continued</td>
<td>USAID supports Pakistan’s efforts to stop polio transmission and eliminate the threat of this disease. Massive national vaccination campaigns target every child in the country, including Malakand, in door-to-door efforts several times per year so that all children get vaccinated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned New Health Programs</td>
<td>To be decided</td>
<td>Starting in 2010</td>
<td>Several new health programmes are currently being planned with the federal and provincial Ministries of Health, which will bring benefits to the people of Malakand. These will include assistance in primary health care service delivery, procurement of contraceptives/other health commodities, health worker training, water and sanitation and disease surveillance programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malakand Reconstruction Project</td>
<td>$36 million</td>
<td>December 2010–September 2011</td>
<td>USAID reconstructs 108 schools; 35 health facilities, out of which 17 will be equipped with essential medical equipment and supplies; and 6 water systems damaged by security operation in the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
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<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed-Links</td>
<td>$10.3 million</td>
<td>February 2010–September 2010</td>
<td>USAID is refurbishing 150 schools by establishing classroom-based libraries, providing management training to principals, providing student/teacher kits, equipping science labs, providing furniture and school supplies and renovating classrooms in Malakand division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDP assistance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Assistance provided by USAID OFDA</td>
<td>$109 million</td>
<td>Fiscal year 2008–continued</td>
<td>Funds were used to purchase and distribute household items such as bedding, kitchen sets, jerry cans, flashlights and food items. Water systems, toilets and shower stalls were set up; garbage removal was organised; health care and nutrition supplements were made available; shelter material was distributed; cash-for-work projects and early recovery activities were carried out; and safe environments were created for the displaced persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repatriation of Malakand IDPs</td>
<td>$44 million</td>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>USAID has supported the government of Pakistan’s debit card programme for qualifying IDPs by providing repatriation payment of Rs 25,000 each to 260,000 families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP Students University Support</td>
<td>$4 million</td>
<td>April 2010</td>
<td>USAID has supported budgets of 22 universities that provided education to 7,000 IDP students who were eligible for one-year fee compensation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: USAID Pakistan website
The following is a list of projects in the UN Humanitarian Response Plan for Pakistan 2010 that have received partial and full funding; these projects will be implemented only in Malakand division. (There are also provincial-level projects that also might include Malakand Division but these are not listed here.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Appealing agency</th>
<th>Funding covered till July 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revitalization of farming-based livelihood options for the crisis-affected families of Swat and Buner to restore and revive their income sources.</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviving livelihoods through handicrafts in post-crisis areas in Swat.</td>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic revitalisation and emergency livelihoods support for crisis-affected households of Swat, Buner and FATA to restore and revive their income sources.</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoration and rehabilitation of communities in affected districts of Malakand division and FATA agencies.</td>
<td>UND</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency livelihood support to facilitate return and early recovery in Swat, Buner and Di Khan.</td>
<td>Oxfam GB</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restoration of livelihoods of conflict-affected families of Swat in KP province of Pakistan.</td>
<td>Danchurchaid</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based PHC services in 3 districts of NWFP (Swat, Buner and Dir).</td>
<td>Helping Hand for Relief and Development</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of comprehensive primary health care services to the crisis affected population in Shangla.</td>
<td>Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development Aid (Dutch NGO)</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to basic health services for affected/ displaced population, prevention of major diseases outbreak, ensuring access to essential package of PHC services and psychosocial support to returnees and other affected populations in Swat district.</td>
<td>Malteser International</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase equitable access to integrated essential primary health care services for the affected population of Swat and Malakand.</td>
<td>American Refugee Committee</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of essential PHC services (facility and community based) for the affected population in districts of Charsadda and Malakand (NWFP).</td>
<td>Johanniter Unfallhilfe e.V</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency nutritional services to crisis-affected areas of Swat (Zone 1 &amp; 4), Buner (TMA 2), in NWFP and FATA.</td>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery and rehabilitation of water and sanitation systems in affected areas in Swat district.</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick impact WASH intervention and emergency WASH preparedness for crisis-affected returnees and stayees of Buner and Swat.</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ‘Funding’ means contributions + commitments. Commitment: creation of a legal, contractual obligation between the donor and recipient entity, specifying the amount to be contributed. Contribution: the actual payment of funds or transfer of in-kind goods from the donor to the recipient entity.

References


COMSATS (Commission on Science and Technology for Sustainable Development in the South) (2009), ‘Workshop on Livelihood, Security and Development in Post Conflict Swat, NWFP’. Islamabad: COMSATS.


WFP (World Food Programme) (2010) *Food Security and Market Assessment in the Crisis Areas of NWFP and FATA, Pakistan*. Islamabad: WFP.


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